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ASEAN INVESTMENT TREATIES, RCEP, AND CPTPP:
REGIONAL STRATEGIES, NORMS, INSTITUTIONS, AND
POLITICS
Diane A. Desierto†
Abstract: Southeast Asia attracts foreign investment more rapidly than elsewhere
in the world, including China. Southeast Asia’s evolving regional strategies, norms,
institutions, and politics for investment governance should be of considerable interest to
global decision-makers. This Article compares evolving investment treaty strategies and
norms between the regional investment treaties of: (1) the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (“ASEAN”); (2) the latest draft investment chapter of the China-led sixteenmember Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”), to which all ten
ASEAN Member States are also negotiating parties; and (3) some features of the current
draft investment chapter for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (now renamed the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”)).
Cite as: Diane A. Desierto, ASEAN Investment Treaties, RCEP, and CPTPP: Regional
Strategies, Norms, Institutions, and Politics, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 349 (2018).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The importance of the regional dimension in economic diplomacy has
fluctuated over time because of doubts about the effectiveness of the
multilateral system. 1 Regional economic agreements, although often
†

Associate Professor (tenured) of Human Rights Law and Global Affairs, Keough School of Global
Affairs with concurrent appointment at the Law School, University of Notre Dame; Professor of International
Law and Human Rights, Philippine Judicial Academy of the Supreme Court of the Philippines; Adjunct
Fellow, WSD Handa Center for Human Rights and International Justice, Stanford University. All views and
errors mine. I can be reached at dianedesierto@aya.yale.edu. With thanks to Dr. Tim Buehrer at the ASEAN
Connectivity through Trade and Investment, and counsels at the ASEAN Legal Affairs Division for various
discussions, as well as to Professor Susan Franck, President of the Academic Council of the Institute of
Transnational Arbitration, for our previous discussions on treaty monitoring and oversight mechanisms.
1
For ease of reference, recurring acronyms used in footnotes and the body text of this Article will be
listed here in alphabetical order: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”); ASEAN
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (“ACIA”); ASEAN Economic Community (“AEC”); ASEAN
Investment Area (“AIA”); bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”); Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam
(“CMLV”); Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”);
Coordinating Committee on Investment (“CCI”); European Union (“EU”); fair and equitable treatment
(“FET”); foreign direct investment (“FDI”); free trade agreement (“FTA”); full protection and security
(“FPS”); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”); International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID”); international investment agreement (“IIA”); International Monetary Fund
(“IMF”); merger and acquisition (“M&A”); micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprise (“MSME”); most
favored nation (“MFN”); multinational enterprise (“MNE”); Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(“RCEP”); special and differential treatment (“SDT”); trade and investment framework agreement (“TIFA”);
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”); United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”); World Trade Organization (“WTO”).
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politically motivated, offer a more rapid way of opening markets.
Liberalization may be easier for national interests to accept when it occurs
within a regional group of countries with broadly the same levels of
development and similar policy preferences.2 Regional economic integration
necessitates policy and regulatory changes and refinements in most, if not all,
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) Member States, taking
into consideration their different levels of development.3
Under the unique horizontally embedded economic integration model
in the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN Economic Community (“AEC”)
Blueprint, Southeast Asia is poised to escalate its regional investment rulemaking and institutional architecture. This is particularly so with its massive
cross-border projects targeted under the ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity
2025, as well as with flagship investment projects with key ASEAN regional
partners: China (through the One Belt, One Road program), Japan (in relation
to its Quality Infrastructure program), South Korea, the European Union,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States.
Part II describes the current state of Southeast Asia’s burgeoning sources
of foreign investment growth in the past decade and the targets for regional
foreign investment expansion under the AEC Blueprint and Master Plan on
Connectivity. Part III examines ASEAN’s regional investment treaties to
date—scrutinizing various common features to establish both ASEAN’s
preferences for investment openness and retention of regulatory space for
host-states to foreign investment. These common features of regional
commitments are then examined alongside Southeast Asia’s other
contemplated regional commitments in the draft investment chapters of the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”) and the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
(“CPTPP”), particularly in the substantive areas of scope of investment,
investment protection standards, public policy provisions to defend host-state
regulatory policies, transparency requirements and treaty monitoring policies,
and investor-state dispute settlement options. Noting divergences in the
quality of Southeast Asia’s regional commitments throughout these regimes,
Part IV anticipates the likely sites for dispute. These sites for dispute are
2
Nicholas Bayne & Stephen Woolcock, What is Economic Diplomacy?, in THE NEW ECONOMIC
DIPLOMACY: DECISION-MAKING AND NEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1, 8–9
(Nicholas Bayne & Stephen Woolcock eds., 3d ed. 2011).
3
ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025, ¶ 38 (Nov. 22, 2015),
http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/aec-page/AEC-Blueprint-2025-FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter AEC Blueprint 2025].
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largely due to the disparate approaches to investment monitoring, treatymaking, and investment governance among countries in Southeast Asia. The
Conclusion suggests recommendations for legal harmonization and
institutional coordination.
II.

SOUTHEAST ASIA INVESTMENT TRENDS AND TARGETS UNDER THE AEC

In recent years, Southeast Asia has experienced a rapid expansion in
foreign direct investment (“FDI”), with the region hailed as attracting “more
foreign direct investment combined than China.”4 Individual Member States
of ASEAN, such as Indonesia,5 Singapore,6 the Philippines,7 and Vietnam,8
are touted as among the world’s fastest-growing economies for FDI. The
ASEAN Investment Report 2017, prepared by the ASEAN Secretariat and the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), found
that despite the global economic situation resulting in the overall FDI flows
in ASEAN falling twenty percent to $96.7 billion in 2016, “there were some
bright spots. Flows from most of ASEAN’s major Dialogue Partner countries
and intra-ASEAN investment rose.”9 The report reasoned that “[t]he decline
4
Nicholas Owen, Southeast Asia Attracts More Foreign Direct Investment than China for Second
Year in a Row, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2015, 12:15 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/southeast-asiainvestment/southeast-asia-attracts-more-foreign-direct-investment-than-china-for-second-year-idUSL4N0
WE1Q620150316.
5
See, e.g., Karlis Salna & Haslinda Amin, Jokowi Says His Reforms are a Success with Growth Above
5%, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 5, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-06/jokowisays-his-reforms-are-a-success-with-growth-back-above-5.
6
See, e.g., Chuang Peck Ming, Singapore Remains a Top FDI Destination Globally, BUS. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 2017, 5:50 AM), http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-remains-atop-fdi-destination-globally.
7
See, e.g., Karl Lester M. Yap, Rising Tiger Philippines Posts Some of the World’s Fastest Growth,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2017, 6:28 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/asia-s-newgrowth-leader-takes-over-from-fading-tiger-economies; Panos Mourdoukoutas, Duterte’s Philippines
Economy Beats China’s, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2017, 2:53 PM) https://www.forbes.com/sites/panos
mourdoukoutas/2017/12/09/dutertes-philippines-economy-beats-chinas/; Panos Mourdoukoutas, Duterte’s
Philippines is the 10th Fastest Growing Economy in the World, FORBES (June 20, 2017, 9:21 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/06/20/dutertes-philippines-is-the-10th-fastestgrowing-economy-in-the-world/; The Philippines Records Highest Foreign Investment Growth in ASEAN,
OXFORD BUS. GROUP (Nov. 22, 2017), https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/philippines-records-highestforeign-investment-growth-asean.
8
See, e.g., Nguyen Dieu Tu Uyen, Vietnam Forecasts Record Foreign Investment of $16 Billion,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2017, 9:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-04/vietnamforecasts-record-foreign-investment-of-over-16-billion.
9
ASEAN SECRETARIAT & UNCTAD, ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2017: FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC ZONES IN ASEAN 43 (2017), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
unctad_asean_air2017d1.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2017]; see also ASEAN
SECRETARIAT & UNCTAD, ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2016: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND MSME
LINKAGES, at xv (2016), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/unctad_asean_air2016d1.pdf [hereinafter
ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2016].
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in 2016 was due to one-off factors,” whereas “[t]he growth of intra-ASEAN
investment derived in part from a spate of greenfield investments and
intraregional [merger and acquisition] activities.” 10 Factors such as
establishment of the AEC and growing regional opportunities both
“contributed to the rise of intra-ASEAN investment, which for the first time
accounted for a quarter of total FDI in the region.”11 The report concluded
that:
Despite the atypical 2016 FDI performance, the region continued
to attract a high level of FDI, reflecting ASEAN’s resilience and
the region’s attractiveness and competitiveness in attracting
investment. Twenty years on from the 1997–1998 Asian
financial crisis, FDI flows in ASEAN have rebounded
significantly to levels surpassing the precrisis peak by more than
2.8 times. The region will continue to attract strong FDI flows
with greater regional value chain and supply chain activities in
the years ahead.12
Southeast Asia’s approach to investment policy and investment governance
has gained significance since the launch of the AEC at the end of 2015,13
spanning a market estimated at $2.6 trillion in value with a combined
population of over 622 million people. 14 Southeast Asia’s approach to
investment policy and governance is depicted as: (1) highly pluralist
(especially regarding investment sources and forms of investment); (2) largely
decentralized with ASEAN investment facilitated through “coordination” by
the AEC institutions with the ASEAN Member State governments; and (3)
relatively passive (at least compared to other regions such as Europe) when it
comes to long-term standardization of investment protection standards, hoststate public policy provisions, and investor-state dispute settlement reform.
In an era where so much of the world is caught up on global reforms to the
investment law system,15 ASEAN focuses its efforts on regional investment
10

ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2017, supra note 9, at 43.
Id.
12
Id.
13
See ASEAN Economic Bloc Launched, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER (Jan. 1, 2016, 2:09 AM),
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/134407/asean-economic-bloc-launched.
14
ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN, http://asean.org/asean-economic-community/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2018).
15
See Press Release, UNCITRAL Secretariat, UNCITRAL to Consider Possible Reform of InvestorState Dispute Settlement, U.N. Press Release UNIS/L/250 (July 14, 2017), http://www.unis.unvienna.org/
unis/en/pressrels/2017/unisl250.html.
11
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promotion incentives16 while leaving investment protection to the individual
initiatives of the respective governments of ASEAN Member States.17 As of
this writing, ASEAN has not yet built any long-term regional governance
infrastructure to address cross-border problems that may arise from such a
rapid expansion of FDI across and within Southeast Asian borders.18
The unique state of ASEAN investment policy-making should also be
considered in the context of Southeast Asia’s ambitious targets for short- and
long-term regional investment. The AEC Blueprint 2025 sets forth the
following policy targets for ASEAN’s investment environment:
ASEAN aims to enhance further its attractiveness as an
investment destination globally through the establishment of an
open, transparent, and predictable investment regime in the
region. The improvement in the investment environment in
ASEAN is being achieved through the implementation of the
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), which
(i) provides for progressive liberalisation of existing investment
restrictions in manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, forestry, and
mining and the services incidental to these sectors; (ii)
significantly strengthens investment protection; and (iii) ensures
transparency of investment laws, regulations, and administrative
guidelines.19

16

See Mayvelin U. Carballo, BMI Sees ASEAN Growth Sustained, MANILA TIMES (Nov. 27, 2017),
http://www.manilatimes.net/bmi-sees-asean-growth-sustained/365216/.
17
See Diane A. Desierto, Regulatory Freedom and Control in the New ASEAN Regional Investment
Treaties, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 1018 (2015); see generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, SOUTHEAST
ASIA INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES: TAX & OTHER INCENTIVES (Greg Lamont ed., 2012),
https://www.pwc.com/th/en/publications/download/south-east-asia-web.pdf.
18
See generally Anja Kaspersen, 7 Sources of Geo-Economic Risk in East Asia, WORLD ECON. F.
(May 12, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/7-sources-of-geo-economic-risk-in-east-asia/;
Alexander C. Chandra & Fina Astriana, Environmental Protection in the Post-2015 ASEAN Economic
Community, HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.boell.de/en/2015/10/28/umweltschutzder-asean-wirtschaftsgemeinschaft-nach-2015; Wee Ee Cheong, Deepening Connectivity Within ASEAN,
BANGKOK POST (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/news/1372007/deepeningconnectivity-within-asean; Amelia U. Santos-Paulino, The Asian Economic Integration Cooperation
Agreement: Lessons for Economic and Social Development 11–13, UNCTAD/SER.RP/2017/3 (UNCTAD,
Research Paper No. 3, 2017), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ser-rp-2017d3_en.pdf.
19
AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 3, ¶ 14.
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Strategic measures for attaining this investment environment identified within
the AEC Blueprint 2025 range from eliminating “investment restrictions and
impediments” to promoting “ASEAN as an investment destination.”20
This Article examines the nature of ASEAN’s regional commitments
towards investment protection and host-state public policy protection, along
with its emerging investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms within the
broader framework of dispute settlement in the AEC. It seeks to identify
commonalities and differences in the quality of ASEAN’s regional obligations
in its six current regional investment treaties (both intra-ASEAN21 and with
the following countries: Australia and New Zealand, 22 China, 23 South
Korea,24 India,25 and Hong Kong26) alongside its draft investment chapters in
the larger mega-regional agreements, such as the RCEP 27 the CPTPP.28 It
20

Id. ¶ 15.
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009, ASEAN Legal Instruments No. 30
(entered into force Feb. 24, 2012), http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140119035519.pdf
[hereinafter ACIA].
22
Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area ch. 11, Feb. 27, 2009,
2672 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 2010), http://asean.org/storage/2012/05/AANZFTA-legal-textPRINTED-Signed.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter].
23
Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Between the People’s Republic of China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Aug. 15, 2009
(entered into force Jan. 1 2010), http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/archive/
22974.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN-China Investment Agreement].
24
Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Among the Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and the Republic of Korea, June 2, 2009 (entered into force Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.asean.org/
storage/images/archive/22973.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement].
25
Agreement on Investment Under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of India, Nov. 12, 2014,
http://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ASEAN-India-Investment-Agreement-ASEANversion.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN-India Investment Agreement].
26
Agreement on Investment Among the Governments of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People’s Republic of China and the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, Nov. 12, 2017, https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/ita/fta/hkasean/files/IPPAASEAN.pdf [hereinafter
ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement].
27
Treaty Draft, RCEP Working Grp. in Inv., RCEP Draft Investment Text (Oct. 16, 2015),
https://rceplegal.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/03-rcep-wgi10-draftconsolidated-investmenttext.pdf
[hereinafter RCEP Draft Investment Chapter]; see also Treaty Draft, RCEP Working Grp. in Inv., RCEP
Draft Chapter on Investment: Temporary Safeguard Measures (Dec. 6–10, 2016),
https://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/rcep-invesment-temporarysafeguardmeasures.pdf.
28
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 9, expected to open
for signature Mar. 8, 2018, https://mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Text/9.-InvestmentChapter.pdf [hereinafter CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter]. Although, note must be taken of the key elements
of the CPTPP and the draft provisions of the TPP on investor-state dispute settlement that are to be suspended.
See Donald Robertson et al., A Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS LLP (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/
latest-thinking/a-comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership; see also Press
21
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considers the dearth of regional investment governance institutions in
ASEAN, which may affect the harmonization of differing regional standards
of investment protection and public policy innovation for Southeast Asia, and
situates the current mechanisms for investor-state dispute settlement within
the framework of dispute settlement under the AEC and the ASEAN Charter.
These differences, should they remain unaddressed in the ASEAN regional
governance institutions, will likely be detrimental to the achievement of
ASEAN objectives for expanding Southeast Asia’s attractiveness as a global
investment destination.
Preliminarily, one should note that not all ASEAN Member States
enjoy the same level of FDI growth 29 —among the ten ASEAN Member
States, it has been variably favorable between the more established ASEAN6 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, and
Thailand) and the CMLV grouping (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and
Vietnam, or collectively “CMLV”). The 2016 ASEAN Investment Report
notes that “[t]he performance of ASEAN Member States differed in attracting
FDI; five received higher inflows, two had inflows at a level similar to that of
2014, and three witnessed a decline.”30 Key findings of the 2016 ASEAN
Investment Report include, among others: (1) a marked rise of FDI in
manufacturing and all-time highs in equity capital financing of FDI activities,
combined with strong regional investment expansion by multinational
enterprises (“MNEs”); 31 (2) intra-ASEAN investment and mergers and
acquisitions (“M&As”) remain the largest source of FDI flows;32 (3) investor
perceptions improved after the launch of the AEC in December 2015;33 (4)
ASEAN is a major FDI destination for South Korea as part of its value chain
activities; 34 (5) ASEAN is the largest host for United States companies in
Asia, with over 1500 American companies operating in ASEAN and an
expanding MNE regional footprint in ASEAN using the region as a
production platform, a site for sourcing operations, and a base from which to

Release, TPP Ministers of Australia et al., Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement (Nov. 11, 2017),
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/news/Pages/trans-pacific-partnership-ministerial-statement.aspx.
29
See Owen, supra note 4; Keiko Ujikane, Japan Shifts Investment from China to Southeast Asia,
BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-30/southeastasia-is-winning-more-japanese-investment-than-china.
30
ASEAN INVESTMENT REPORT 2016, supra note 9, at xv.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at xvii.
34
Id. at xviii–xix.
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sell to regional and global markets;35 and (6) micro-, small-, and mediumsized enterprises (“MSMEs”) remain key economic actors in all ASEAN
Member States, with MSMEs often operating as contract manufacturers for
local and foreign MNEs and later internationalizing themselves as FDI
exporters to other countries.36
The AEC’s Consolidated Strategic Action Plan for 2025 identifies
various actions and measures to achieve the overall objective of “enhanc[ing]
further ASEAN’s attractiveness as an investment destination globally through
the establishment of an open, transparent[,] and predictable investment regime
in the region.”37 These include: (1) completing the built-in agenda of the
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (“ACIA”), which is
applicable to all ten ASEAN Member States, including the elimination or
improvement of investment restrictions and impediments; (2) identifying
appropriate mechanisms to phase out and reduce the ACIA reservation lists;
(3) continuing and enhancing the work of the ASEAN Coordinating
Committee on Investment (“CCI”), specifically its peer review mechanism;
and (4) jointly promoting the ACIA and ASEAN, the latter as an “investment
destination.”38
Within the current structure of the AEC, there is no standing regional
investment institution that is centrally responsible for investment promotion,
monitoring, or oversight among the ASEAN Member States. Rather, it is the
ASEAN Investment Area (“AIA”) Council that is the “[m]inisterial body
under the ASEAN Economic Ministers responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the [ACIA], ASEAN’s main economic instrument to
realise a free and open investment regime.”39 The Council “is composed of
Ministers from the ten Member States responsible for investment and the
Secretary-General of ASEAN.” 40 The CCI supports the AIA Council in
carrying out its functions and is composed of senior investment officials and
officials from other government agencies.41
35

Id. at xx–xxii.
Id. at xxii–xxxi.
37
ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community 2025 Consolidated Strategic Action Plan, at 7 (Feb. 6,
2017), http://asean.org/storage/2017/02/Consolidated-Strategic-Action-Plan.pdf.
38
Id. at 7–8.
39
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) Council, ASEAN, http://asean.org/asean-economiccommunity/asean-investment-area-aia-council/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2018).
40
Id.
41
Id.
36
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Notwithstanding the lack of any standing formal regional body or
institution to oversee the harmonization of investment regulations within and
between ASEAN Member States, ASEAN Member States have ambitiously
enacted several regional investment treaties, distinct and separate from each
state’s continuing respective bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) program.42
Historically, the top sources of ASEAN FDI inflows are the European Union,
Japan, ASEAN, China, Hong Kong, the United States, South Korea, Australia,
Taiwan, and India.43 ASEAN’s foremost sources of FDI inflows from 2013–
2015 are as follows:44
Partner Country/Region

2013 Percentage Share
of Total Net Inflows

2014 Percentage Share
of Total Net Inflows

2015 Percentage Share
of Total Net Inflows

ASEAN
Australia
Canada
China
European Union (28)
India
Japan
New Zealand
Pakistan
Republic of Korea
Russian Federation
United States
Others
Total FDI Inflows to
ASEAN

15.7
2.1
0.7
5.1
19.6
1.7
19.8
0.3
0.0
3.4
0.5
5.7
25.4
100

17.0
4.8
1.3
5.4
19.2
0.5
12.1
0.4
0.0
4.4
0.1
11.3
23.6
100

18.4
4.3
0.7
6.8
16.7
1.3
14.5
1.9
0.0
4.7
0.0
11.3
19.3
100

According to UNCTAD, there are sixteen listed investment treaties to
which ASEAN is a party.45 This Article focuses on scrutinizing the structure,
commitments, and institutional design provided in the six regional investment
treaties concluded under ASEAN’s charter-based regime since it came into
force in December 2008. 46 This Article contrasts these with the draft
42
For other works on ASEAN regional investment treaties, see Diane A. Desierto, Investment
Treaties: ASEAN, in ASIA RISING: GROWTH AND RESILIENCE IN AN UNCERTAIN GLOBAL ECONOMY 184 (Hal
Hill & Maria Socorro Gochoco-Bautista eds., 2013); Desierto, supra note 17, at 1018–57.
43
See Statistics, ASEAN Secretariat, Top Ten Sources of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows in
ASEAN (Dec. 31, 2014) http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/January/foreign_direct_investment_
statistic/Table%2027.pdf.
44
Statistics, ASEAN Secretariat, Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows in ASEAN from Selected
Partner Countries/Regions (Oct. 5, 2016), http://asean.org/storage/2015/09/Table-26_oct2016.pdf.
45
International Investments Agreement Navigator: ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations),
UNCTAD INV. POL’Y HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryGroupingTreaties/
15#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Feb. 23, 2018).
46
See ASEAN Charter (entered into force Dec. 15, 2008), http://agreement.asean.org/media/
download/20160509062115.pdf. The Charter further requires “Member States [to] take all necessary
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investment chapter of the proposed RCEP47 (where all ten ASEAN Member
States are negotiating parties) and the proposed draft investment chapter of
the CPTPP (where ASEAN Member States Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Vietnam are parties, 48 while the Philippines 49 and Indonesia 50 are
contemplating membership). There are other investment framework
agreements or investment provisions in other agreements with ASEAN’s key
economic partners, such as the United States51 and Japan.52
However, these agreements and provisions remain incipient or
undeveloped. They are largely agreements set up in principle to agree on
specific commitments at a later point in time. This Article will focus on the
following six specifically negotiated ASEAN regional investment treaties and
contrast the same with the draft RCEP investment chapter and the draft
CPTPP investment chapter: (1) the 2009 ACIA, 53 which applies to
investments made in ASEAN Member States by investors from any other
ASEAN Member State; 54 (2) Chapter 11 (Investment) of the Agreement
Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area;55 (3) the
2009 ASEAN-South Korea Investment Agreement;56 (4) the 2010 ASEANChina Investment Agreement; 57 (5) the 2014 ASEAN-India Investment
Agreement;58 and (6) the 2017 ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement.59

measures, including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the
provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership.” Id. art. 5, ¶ 2.
47
See RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27.
48
See CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28.
49
Richmond Mercurio, Philippines Revives Plan to Join Trans-Pacific Trade Bloc, PHILIPPINE STAR
(Sept. 23, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://www.philstar.com/business/2017/09/24/1741930/philippines-revives-planjoin-trans-pacific-trade-bloc.
50
Indonesia Reconsidering TPP Plans, Eyes Bilateral Deals, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2017, 3:26 AM),
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-trade/indonesia-reconsidering-tpp-plans-eyes-bilateral-dealsidUKKBN15918X.
51
Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement Between the United States of America and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Aug. 25, 2006, T.I.A.S. No. 06-825.1 https://ustr.gov/sites/default/
files/uploads/agreements/tifa/asset_upload_file932_9760.pdf [hereinafter US-ASEAN TIFA].
52
Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership Among Japan and Member States of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Apr. 14, 2008, Treaty No. 5, 2008 Jōyaku web 103,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/asean/agreement.pdf [hereinafter ASEAN-Japan FTA].
53
ACIA, supra note 21.
54
See JULIEN CHAISSE & SUFIAN JUSOH, THE ASEAN COMPREHENSIVE INVESTMENT AGREEMENT:
THE REGIONALISATION OF LAWS AND POLICY ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 72–73 (2016).
55
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22.
56
ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24.
57
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23.
58
ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25.
59
ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26.
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A careful understanding of the above treaties alongside ASEAN
Member States’ prospective commitments in the RCEP and the CPTPP is
critical in light of the AEC’s ongoing development and its distinct path to
economic integration.60 The free flow of investment in ASEAN is the third
core element of the envisaged ASEAN single market and production base
under the AEC, together with the other core elements of free flow of goods,
the free flow of services, the freer flow of capital, and the free flow of skilled
labor.61 Accordingly, the AEC Blueprint explicitly recognizes that a free and
open investment regime “is key to enhancing ASEAN’s competitiveness in
attracting foreign direct investment as well as intra-ASEAN investment.”62
To achieve this regime, the AEC Blueprint mandates the establishment
of “more transparent, consistent[,] and predictable investment rules,
regulations, policies and procedures,” 63 to be undertaken through the
following specific enumerated actions:
i.
Harmonise, where possible, investment policies to achieve
industrial complementation and economic integration;
ii.
Streamline and simplify procedures for investment
applications and approvals;
iii. Promote dissemination of investment information: rules,
regulations, policies and procedures, including through one-stop
investment centre or investment promotion board;
iv. Strengthen databases on all forms of investments covering
goods and services to facilitate policy formulation;
v.
Strengthen coordination among government ministries and
agencies concerned;
vi. Consultation with ASEAN private sectors to facilitate
investment; and
vii. Identify and work towards areas of complementation
ASEAN-wide as well as bilateral integration.64

60

See Diane A. Desierto, ASEAN’s Constitutionalization of International Law: Challenges to
Evolution Under the New ASEAN Charter, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 268 (2011); MICHAEL G. PLUMMER,
ASEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: TRADE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND FINANCE 1–16 (2009).
61
AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 3, ¶¶ 9, 11, 16, 19.
62
ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, ¶ 23 (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.asean.org/
wp-content/uploads/images/archive/5187-10.pdf [hereinafter AEC Blueprint 2007].
63
Id. ¶ 28.
64
Id. ¶ 28(i)–(vii).
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ASEAN’s regional investment agreements (as contained in distinct
international investment agreements (“IIAs”) or investment chapters in
ASEAN free trade agreements (“FTAs”), as well as the individual ASEAN
Member States’ BIT programs and investment chapters in their respective
FTAs) collectively form the key legal foundations of ASEAN’s emerging
regional investment policies. The European Union (“EU”), much unlike
ASEAN, is still in the process of defining its architectural “comprehensive
European international investment policy”65 and debating proposed investorstate dispute settlement innovations such as the creation of a “global
investment court.”66 ASEAN is the only regional organization in the world to
date that has swiftly concluded six regional investment agreements, as either
stand-alone investment treaties or investment chapters in ASEAN FTAs.67
As of this writing, ASEAN is still exploring other possible regional
investment agreements, albeit at different stages of political dialogue. It is in
negotiations with the EU. Notwithstanding the EU’s bilateral FTAs with
individual ASEAN Member States (such as Singapore 68 ), the EU has
indicated interest in a future region-to-region FTA.69 The United States has
previously shown interest in a trade and investment partnership with ASEAN
through the Obama Administration’s Expanded Economic Engagement
(“E3”) Initiative, which sought to address investor protection.70 Trade and
65

See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards a Comprehensive European
International Investment Policy, at 2, COM (2010) 343 final, July 7, 2010, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf.
66
See Shawn Donnan, EU Calls for Global Investment Court, FIN. TIMES (May 5, 2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/c1f2c4b2-f34a-11e4-8141-00144feab7de; see also Commission Concept Paper
on Investment in TTIP and Beyond—The Path for Reform: Enhancing the Right to Regulate and Moving from
Current Ad Hoc Arbitration Towards an Investment Court (May 5, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF.
67
See Desierto, supra note 17, at 1020–22.
68
See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore ch. 9,
negotiations concluded Oct. 17, 2014 (not yet signed), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/october/
tradoc_152844.pdf [hereinafter Draft EU-Singapore FTA].
69
See Foreign Ministers Rekindle Interest in EU-ASEAN FTA, ASEAN BRIEFING (Aug. 4, 2014),
https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2014/08/04/foreign-ministers-rekindle-interest-eu-asean-fta.html;
Press Release, Dep’t for Bus., Innovation & Skills, EU Agrees Mandates for Negotiations on Investment with
China and with the ASEAN Member Countries (Oct. 18, 2013) (UK), https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/eu-agrees-mandates-for-negotiations-on-investment-with-china-and-with-the-aseanmember-countries.
70
There is no FTA between the United States and ASEAN to date, with parties still proceeding under
the 2006 TIFA. See US-ASEAN TIFA, supra note 51; see also Murry Hiebert, The E3 Initiative: The United
States and ASEAN Take a Step in the Right Direction, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Dec. 21, 2012),
http://csis.org/publication/e3-initiative-united-states-and-asean-take-step-right-direction. Several ASEAN
Member States (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam) were individually engaged in
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investment negotiations with Canada are being conducted under the 1991
ASEAN-Canada Economic Cooperation Agreement. 71
It is also critical to stress at the outset that each ASEAN Member State
maintained its respective BIT program (either in the form of stand-alone BITs
or as investment chapters in a Member State’s own FTAs with other partners)
in addition to ASEAN’s regional investment agreements. As of this writing,
there are a total of 644 BITs or investment chapters in FTAs from all ten
ASEAN Member States.72 No reported investor-state dispute has yet arisen
from any of the ASEAN regional investment treaties.73
Part III of this Article will compare and contrast the ASEAN regional
investment treaty provisions with provisions of the draft RCEP investment
chapter on the following matters: (1) the definition of “investment” and
negotiations with the United States on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement prior to 2017. See TransPacific Partnership (TPP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Feb. 27, 2018).
71
See Joint Declaration Between ASEAN and Canada on Trade and Investment, Oct. 2, 2011,
http://www.asean.org/storage/2012/05/2011-10-02-ASEAN-Canada-Joint-Declaration-on-Trade-andInvestment-FINAL-As-adopted-by-Ministers-on-October-2-2011.pdf.
72
Data aggregated as of March 31, 2015, through IIA databases provided by UNCTAD. See IIA
Databases, UNCTAD, http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20
(IIA)/IIA-Tools.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2018). Brunei Darussalam has eight BITs (five of which are in
force) and seventeen investment chapters in FTAs (fifteen of which are in force). Id. Cambodia has twentyone BITs (eleven of which are in force) and fifteen investment chapters in FTAs (thirteen of which are in
force). Id. Indonesia has sixty-four BITs (forty-six of which are in force) and fifteen investment chapters in
FTAs (thirteen of which are in force). Id. However, Indonesia has recently announced its inclination to
terminate, suspend, or review its pre-existing investment treaty program. See Ben Bland & Shawn Donnan,
Indonesia to Terminate More Than 60 Bilateral Investment Treaties, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0. Laos has twenty-four BITs (nineteen
of which are in force) and sixteen investment chapters in FTAs (thirteen of which are in force). IIA Databases,
supra. Malaysia has sixty-nine BITs (fifty of which are in force) and twenty-two investment chapters in FTAs
(nineteen of which are in force). Id. Myanmar has eight BITs (five of which are in force) and fifteen
investment chapters in FTAs (twelve of which are in force). Id. The Philippines has thirty-seven BITs (thirtyone of which are in force) and fourteen investment chapters in FTAs (twelve of which are in force). Id.
Singapore has forty-five BITs (thirty-eight of which are in force) and twenty-seven investment chapters in
FTAs (twenty-five of which are in force). Id. Thailand has thirty-nine BITs (thirty-six of which are in force)
and twenty-two investment chapters in FTAs (eighteen of which are in force). Id. Vietnam has sixty BITs
(forty-six of which are in force) and nineteen investment chapters in FTAs (fifteen of which are in force). Id.
73
The sole arbitration case brought to date under an ASEAN investment agreement is Yaung Chi Oo
Trading Pte. Ltd. v. Gov’t of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB/01/01, Award (Mar. 31,
2003), 42 I.L.M. 540 (2003). The case involved pre-ASEAN Charter regional investment instruments, such
as the 1987 Agreement Among the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia,
the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, and the Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion
and Protection of Investments; the 1996 Protocol to Amend the Agreement for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments; the 1998 Framework Agreement for the ASEAN Investment Area; and the 1998 Agreement
Between the Government of the Republic of Philippines and the Government of the Union of Myanmar for
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments. Id. ¶¶ 2, 6 83.
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“investors”; (2) the substantive investment protection treaty standards; (3)
exceptions, reservations, and other host-state clauses to defend regulatory
policies; (4) transparency requirements and treaty monitoring or oversight
institutions (if any); and (5) investor-state dispute settlement options. Part IV
discusses particular difficulties that can be anticipated from the continuing
explosion of ASEAN regional investment treaties without providing for
mechanisms for legal harmonization on investment protection standards and
public policy innovations for host-states and omitting to design institutional
coordination at the regional level for the proper monitoring, oversight, and
implementation of these regional treaties. It will also discuss implications of
the diversity of dispute settlement mechanisms in these regional treaties
against the broader framework of dispute settlement processes contemplated
by the AEC. This includes the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute
Settlement Mechanism, which applies to all “future ASEAN economic
agreements,” 74 as well as the ASEAN Charter provisions on interstate
disputes.75 In conclusion, this Article briefly identifies recommendations for
legal harmonization mechanisms and institutional coordination for ASEAN
Member States to consider.
III.

JUXTAPOSING ASEAN REGIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY POLICY
THE RCEP AND CPTPP

WITH

There are common provisions and similar approaches in the ASEAN
regional investment treaties and the draft investment chapters in the RCEP
and CPTPP, which should cause concern over how ASEAN could consistently
defend the policy and regulatory spaces of the ASEAN Member States at the
regional level.
A.

Definition of “Covered Investment”

The definition of “covered investment” is crucial to determining the
threshold scope of the applicability ratione materiae of any investment
treaty.76 The RCEP draft investment chapter defines a “covered investment”
as:
74
ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, art. 1, ¶ 1, Nov. 29, 2004, 2624
U.N.T.S. 177, http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20141217102933.pdf.
75
See ASEAN Charter, arts. 24–26.
76
See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., SCOPE AND DEFINITION: A SEQUEL, at 7–19,
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/2, U.N. Sales No. 11.II.D.9 (2011), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20102_
en.pdf.
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[A]n investment in [the] territory of an investor of another Party,
which is in existence as of the date of entry into force of this
Agreement or established, acquired or expanded thereafter, and
has been admitted, according to its laws, regulations and national
policies, at that time[,] and where applicable, specifically
approved in writing by its competent authority.77
Furthermore, the same draft defines “investment” as:
[A]n enterprise constituted, organised and operated in good faith
by an investor in accordance with the law of a Party in whose
territory the investment is made, taken together with the assets of
the enterprise [or] every kind of asset that an investor owns or
controls, directly or indirectly, and that has the characteristics of
an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment
of capital or other resources, certain duration, the expectation of
gain/s or profit/s, or the assumption of risk . . . and a significance
for the development of the host State.78
The RCEP draft investment chapter also contains a non-exhaustive
enumeration of different forms of investment that would be protected under
this treaty, including:
[S]hares, stocks, bonds and debentures . . . rights under contracts
. . . [c]opyrights, . . . patents, trademarks, industrial designs and
trade names, to the extent they are recognized under the law of
the host State; . . . claims to money or to any contractual
performance related to a business . . . licences, authorisations,
permits, and/or similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic . . .
law of the Host State . . . [and] any other interests of the enterprise
which involve substantial economic activity and out of which the
enterprise derives significant financial value.79
The above definitions are almost identical to the definitions of “covered
investment” and “investment” in the CPTPP draft investment chapter. 80
77
78
79
80

RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 5 (drafting markups omitted).
Id. at 7 (footnote omitted) (drafting markups omitted).
Id. at 7–9 (footnotes omitted) (drafting markups omitted).
See CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.1.
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Unlike the RCEP draft investment chapter, the definition of “investment” in
the CPTPP draft investment chapter does not contain any reference to money
claims, and expressly excludes from its enumerated forms of investment any
“order or judgment entered in a judicial or administrative action.”81 This is
similar to an alternative provision in the draft RCEP investment chapter,
which does contain a clause “for greater clarity,” specifying that “investment”
does not include certain assets of an enterprise, such as: portfolio investments,
futures, or debt securities; claims to money arising from commercial sales
contracts or from the extension of credit in a commercial transaction;
“goodwill, brand value, market share or similar intangible rights;” or any
“order or judgment sought or entered in any judicial, administrative, or arbitral
proceeding.”82 The draft RCEP language defining “covered investment” and
“investment” resembles treaty language adopted in various other investment
agreements. 83 They differ distinctly from the CPTPP draft investment
chapter, which defines “covered investment” and “investment” without any
legality clauses (e.g. investment is made in accordance with laws of the hoststate 84 ), and also do not consider the significance of the investment’s
contribution to the development of the host-state. 85 ASEAN’s regional
investment treaties, together with the RCEP draft investment chapter and the
CPTPP draft investment chapter, still generally permit a fairly expansive
asset-based assessment in the forms of investment beyond the traditional
sources of FDI (e.g. manufacturing operations, greenfield investments,
utilities and energy concessions, among others).
Definitions of “investors” in the draft RCEP investment chapter and the
ASEAN regional investment treaties also carefully reflect the diversity of
nationality, citizenship, and residency requirements as well as the laws of
Southeast Asian states and their external partners. The draft RCEP investment
chapter defines the “investor of a Party” as:

81

Id.
RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 10.
83
See, e.g., ACIA, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 1(a), (c); ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note
25, art. 2, ¶ 1(e); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 2, ¶ 1(a), (c); ASEAN-Korea
Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 1, ¶ 1(c), (j); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note
23, art. 1, ¶ 1(d); ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 1, ¶ 1(b), (e).
84
See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 184–96 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing
various limitations on definitions of “investment”).
85
See Diane A. Desierto, Development as an International Right: Investment in the New Trade-Based
IIAs, 3 TRADE, L. & DEV. 296, 302–06 (2011).
82
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[A] Party [or a] state enterprise thereof[, a] national/natural
person of a Party or a juridical person/an enterprise of a Party,
that seeks[,] attempts to make, is making, or has made an
investment in the territory of another Party; provided, however,
that a natural person who is a dual national shall be deemed to be
exclusively a national of the State of his or her dominant and
effective nationality.86
The definition carries a “for greater certainty” footnote, stating that:
[T]he Parties understand that an investor that . . . “seeks[” or]
“attempts to make” an investment when that . . . investor . . . has
taken concrete action or . . . active steps to make an investment
such as channelling resources or capital in order to set up a
business, or applying for permits or licences. Where a
notification or approval process is required for making an
investment, an investor that “seeks to make” an investment refers
to an investor of another Party that has initiated such notification
or approval process.87
This is a more elaborate definition with substantial qualifiers when compared
to how narrowly “investor” is defined in other ASEAN investment
agreements. 88 Significantly, Article 9.1 of the CPTPP draft investment
chapter purposely considers whether States can themselves be deemed as
investors. 89 It should also be noted that, while both the ASEAN regional
investment treaties and the draft RCEP investment chapter painstakingly
clarify the respective rules and requirements for citizenship, naturalization,
and permanent residency that would qualify an individual to qualify as a
covered investor, as well as rules for juridical persons, none of these
agreements contain any guidance on the matter of “territory” in which
86
RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 12 (footnotes omitted) (drafting markups
omitted).
87
Id. (drafting markups omitted).
88
See, e.g., ACIA, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 1(d) (“[A] natural person of a Member State or a juridical
person of a Member State that is making, or has made an investment in the territory of any other Member
State”); ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2, ¶ 1(f); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment
Chapter, supra note 22, art. 2, ¶ 1(d); ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 1, ¶ 1(k);
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 1, ¶ 1(e); ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment
Agreement, supra note 26, art. 1, ¶ 1(f).
89
CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.1 (“[I]nvestor of a Party means a Party, or a
national or an enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the
territory of another Party.”).
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investment is made. The CPTPP draft investment chapter does not attempt to
clarify these aspects. For a region such as Southeast Asia, which remains
mired in considerable unsettled maritime and territorial delimitation
disputes,90 it is concerning that no guidance exists in any of these treaties on
the interpretation of “territory” in relation to the definition of “investors,”
“investments,” and “covered investments.”
A notable feature in the ASEAN regional investment treaties is how
they commonly define “covered investments” subject to Member States’
domestic laws, administrative rules and regulations, decisions, and policies.
The ACIA refers to investments that have “been admitted according to its
laws, regulations, and national policies.” 91 The ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA
Investment Chapter describes a covered investment as one “which, where
applicable, has been admitted by the host Party, subject to its relevant laws,
regulations[,] and policies.” 92 The ASEAN-China Investment Agreement
expansively defines investment as “every kind of asset invested by the
investors of a Party in accordance with the relevant laws, regulations and
policies of another Party in the territory of the latter.”93 It further clarifies that
the term “policies” is limited to “those affecting investment that are endorsed
and announced by the Government of a Party, and made publicly available in
a written form.” 94 Almost identically, the ASEAN-Korea Investment
Agreement provides for covered investment as that which “has been admitted
according to its laws, regulations and national policies, and where applicable,
specifically approved in writing by its competent authority.”95 The ASEANIndia Investment Agreement likewise refers to investments that have been
admitted by a Party “subject to its relevant laws, regulations[,] and policies.”96
The ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement refers to covered
investments as those that have been “admitted, according to its laws,
regulations[,] and policies, and where applicable, specifically approved in
90
See Alfred Gerstl & Mária Strašáková, Introduction, in UNRESOLVED BORDER, LAND AND
MARITIME DISPUTES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: BI- AND MULTILATERAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACHES
AND ASEAN’S CENTRALITY 1 (Alfred Gerstl & Mária Strašáková eds., 2017).
91
ACIA, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 1(a).
92
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 2, ¶ 1(a) (footnote omitted).
93
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 1, ¶ 1(d) (footnote omitted).
94
Id. art 1, ¶ 1(d) n.1.
95
ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 1, ¶ 1(c) (footnote omitted).
96
ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 1, ¶ 1(b). Although this provision contains
a clarifying footnote limiting protection to investments “which have been specifically approved in writing
for protection by the competent authorities” in regard to Thailand, and “in the case of Cambodia and Vietnam,
‘has been admitted’ means ‘has been specifically registered or approved in writing,’ as the case may be.” Id.
art 1, ¶ 1(b) n.1.
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writing by its competent authority.”97 These are almost identical to the RCEP
draft investment chapter’s formulation for covered investments. The RCEP
draft investment chapter attempts to enumerate measures taken by a host-state
to include “any law, regulation, rule, procedure, requirement or practice[,]
decision, administrative action, or in any other form affecting investors and/or
investments.”98 Significantly, the CPTPP draft investment chapter does not
contain any such reference to “laws, regulations, and policies” in its definition
of covered investments.
The asymmetric and ambiguous content of the phrase “laws,
regulations, and policies” in the ASEAN regional investment treaties and
RCEP draft investment chapter, coupled with its omission from the CPTPP
draft investment chapter, introduces uncertainty as to the scope of covered
investments in ASEAN’s regional investment treaty commitments. The
purpose of introducing such qualifications of compliance with “laws,
regulations, and policies” to the scope of covered investment, ordinarily, is
“to prevent the [BIT] from protecting investments that should not be
protected, particularly because they would be illegal.”99 However, it is the
very same breadth and ambiguity of the corpus of “laws, regulations, and
policies” with which investments are expected to comply. This could create
opportunities for denying treaty protections to foreign investors in the future,
including access to the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.
Investment jurisprudence, after all, has lent different contours to the
interpretation of “in accordance with host state law” clauses. The host-state
has the burden to prove the illegality of the investment as a jurisdictional basis
to deny a foreign investor the applicability of investment treaty protections.100
Often, these kinds of clauses are narrowly read to require investments to have
complied with host-state law only at the time of the admission or
establishment of the investment. 101 Early investor-state arbitral decisions
interpreting these kinds of clauses, such as L.E.S.I. v. Algeria and Desert Line

97

ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 1, ¶ 1(b).
RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 13 (drafting markups omitted).
99
Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 46 (July 23, 2001), 42 I.L.M. 609 (2003).
100
Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award, ¶ 129 (July 12, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0314.pdf.
101
Teinver S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 317–
23 (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1090.pdf.
98
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v. Yemen, both took the position that these clauses only referred to
“fundamental principles of the host State’s law.”102
The above narrow position has been repudiated in subsequent arbitral
awards. The subject-matter scope of “in accordance with host-state law”
clauses can be classified to span: “(i) non-trivial violations of the host State’s
legal order, (ii) violations of the host State’s foreign investment regime, and
(iii) fraud—for instance, to secure the investment or to secure profits.” 103
Inceysa Vallisoletana v. El Salvador treated this type of clause as a critical
requirement when assessing the existence of a covered investment.104 The
arbitral tribunal found sufficient grounds for depriving subject-matter
jurisdiction for the investment’s failure to comply with domestic legal
principles (i.e. the prohibitions against unjust enrichment and benefiting from
one’s own wrongdoing) due to the investor’s acts during the bidding
process. 105 The “in accordance with host state law” clause has also been
argued to encompass criminal acts, such as bribery and corruption,106 as well
as the host-state’s procedural rules for acceptance and admission of foreign
investments.107 In Fraport AG Frankfurt Services Worldwide v. Philippines,
the tribunal also held that when an investment fails to comply with local antidummy legislation, it is less likely to benefit from the coverage of the relevant
BIT. 108 Anderson v. Costa Rica noted that a BIT that contained an “in
accordance with host-state law” clause was a:
102

Desert Line Projects L.L.C v. Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶ 104 (Feb.
6, 2008), 48 I.L.M. 82 (2009); see also L.E.S.I. S.p.A. v. République algérienne démocratique et populaire,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 83(iii) (July 12, 2006),
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C48/DC528_Fr.pdf.
103
Metal-Tech Ltd. v. Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, ¶ 165 (Oct. 4,2013)
(footnotes omitted) (citations omitted), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw3012.pdf.
104
Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award, ¶¶ 207,
252–57 (Aug. 2, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0424_0.pdf.
105
Id.
106
See TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, Award,
¶¶ 163–76 (Dec. 19, 2008), 48 I.L.M. 496 (2009).
107
See H&H Enters. Invs., Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Objections to
Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 44–56 (June 5, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita1012.pdf.
108
Fraport AG Frankfurt Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/25, Award, ¶¶ 384–87, 396–404 (Aug. 16, 2007), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0340.pdf; see also Fraport AG Frankfurt Servs. Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines,
ICSID Case No ARB/03/25, Decision on the Application for Annulment, ¶¶ 89–117, 268–69 (Dec. 23, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0341.pdf (critiquing the prior tribunal’s
interpretation of Philippine criminal statutes, but finding the analysis adequate for the purposes of declining
jurisdiction over an investment not made “in accordance with law”).
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[C]lear indication of the importance that [the States Parties to the
treaty] attached to the legality of investments made by investors
of the other Party and their intention that their laws with respect
to investments be strictly followed. The assurance of legality
with respect to investment has important, indeed crucial,
consequences for the public welfare and economic well-being of
any country.109
The banking regulations at issue in the Anderson tribunal decision were one
type of state law with which investments must comply to benefit from treaty
protection. 110 However, arbitral tribunals have not construed all domestic
laws to fall within the ambit of “in accordance with host state law” clauses so
as to deny treaty protection to investments.111 Inmaris Perestroika Sailing
Maritime Services GmbH v. Ukraine, for example, illustrated that failure to
comply with domestic laws on the mandatory registration of investments did
not necessarily render investments illegal when domestic law did not provide
for this consequence.112
Finally, the recurring references to domestic law throughout ASEAN’s
regional investment commitments cause difficulty when determining the
precise content of the local policy or domestic law to which the “covered
investment” is supposed to conform. One should bear in mind that ASEAN
Member States include a vast number of legal regimes, traditions, and systems
of government. 113 It is not readily evident how much of domestic law is
contemplated—does “covered investment” refer not just to investment
statutes and administrative issuances, but also to related statutes on
environment, labor laws, social laws, corporate reportorial requirements,
among others? Undertaking the comparative work to identify the relevant
domestic laws of the ASEAN Member States would conceivably impose
significant costs on the process of attracting investment. At the very least,
109

Anderson v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, Award, ¶ 53 (May 19, 2010),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0031.pdf.
110
Id. ¶¶ 55–57.
111
See Tokios Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award, ¶ 97 (July 26, 2007),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0866.pdf (rejecting minor administrative
defects as a basis to show the illegality of an investment).
112
Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Mar. Servs. GmbH v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ¶ 145 (Mar. 8, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/
C320/DC1490_En.pdf.
113
See Legal Systems in ASEAN, ASEAN L. ASS’N, http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/legal.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
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prospective foreign investors now conducting their due diligence in ASEAN
Member States would have to include the content of domestic laws a priori to
evaluate the actual protection afforded by ASEAN’s regional investment
treaties and prospective commitments under the RCEP draft investment
chapter and CPTPP draft investment chapter.114 More importantly, the lack
of clarity and harmonization in how ASEAN treats the scope of “covered
investments” could give rise to claims that some external partners are
ultimately favored and given better access to investment protection by
ASEAN than other external partners.
B.

Substantive Investment Protection Standards

The RCEP draft investment chapter provides very detailed clauses,
consolidated criteria, tests, and footnoted clarifications on extending
protections to investors and investments based on national treatment,115 mostfavored-nation treatment,116 and minimum standard of treatment.117 In regard
to the national treatment standard, for example, the RCEP draft investment
chapter defines national treatment as the obligation to:
[A]ccord to investors of another/the other Party, and to covered
investments of investors of any other Party[,] treatment no less
favorable than that it accords through its measures, in like
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the
establishment, . . . acquisition, expansion, management, conduct,
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its
territory.118
However, the next provision in that same Article states:
A determination of whether investments or investors are in “like
circumstances” should be made, based upon an objective
assessment of all circumstances on a case-by-case basis,
including, inter alia:
114

As of this writing, the only handbook on an ASEAN regional investment treaty does not contain any
index on the relevant domestic laws that may apply, nor does it contain any references or authorities for
investors to locate such domestic laws. See ASEAN SECRETARIAT, ASEAN COMPREHENSIVE INVESTMENT
AGREEMENT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR BUSINESSES AND INVESTORS (2d ed. 2015).
115
RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 1618.
116
Id. at 1820.
117
Id. at 20–22.
118
Id. at 16–17 (drafting markups omitted).
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i.
the sector the investor is in;
ii.
the location of the investment;
iii. the aim of the measure concerned; and
iv. the regulatory process generally applied in relation to the
measure concerned. The examination shall not be limited or
biased towards any one factor.119
The most-favored nation (“MFN”) standard is the obligation to “accord to
investors of another/any other Party treatment no less favourable than that it
accords, in like circumstances, to investors of any other Party or . . . non-Party
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its
territory.” 120 However, the RCEP draft investment chapter also sets forth
matters that will not be subject to MFN treatment, such as “any preferential
treatment accorded to investors and/or their investments under any existing
bilateral, regional[,] and/or international agreements or any forms of
economic or regional cooperation with any non-Party;” as well as “any
existing or future preferential treatment accorded to investors and/or their
investments in any agreement or arrangement between or among ASEAN
Member States.”121 The minimum standard of treatment is spelled out in the
RCEP draft investment chapter as a duty of all parties not to:
[S]ubject Covered Investments made by investors of the other
Party to measures which constitute a violation of customary
international law, through:
i.
denial of justice in any judicial or administrative
proceedings; or
ii.
fundamental breach of due process; or
iii. targeted discrimination on manifestly unjustified grounds,
such as gender, race or religious belief; or
iv. manifestly abusive treatment, such as coercion, duress and
harassment.122
The same provision continues on to detail specific provisions prescribing fair
and equitable treatment, full protection, and security, among other things.
119
120
121
122

Id. at 17.
Id. at 18–19 (drafting markups omitted).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20 (footnote omitted).
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Most significantly, the draft RCEP investment chapter articulates the parties’
express understanding that “each Party has different forms of administrative,
legislative and judicial systems and that each Party at different levels of
development may not achieve the same standards at the same time,” noting
that the minimum standard of treatment provision “does not establish a single
international standard in this context.”123
In contrast, the CPTPP draft investment chapter contains fewer detailed
qualifications in its standards for investment protection than the RCEP draft
investment chapter. The CPTPP draft investment chapter’s traditional
formulation of national treatment determines the required treatment “in like
circumstances” according to the “totality of circumstances, including whether
the relevant treatment distinguishes between investors or investments on the
basis of legitimate public welfare objectives,” 124 without explaining the
conceptual parameters of such “legitimate public welfare objectives.” The
MFN treatment standard is liberal in scope and is only barred from application
to dispute resolution mechanisms.125 This is intended to avoid controversies
over third parties accessing the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism
through MFN clauses.126
There is even more disparity between the substantive investment
protection standards in the RCEP investment chapter and the more concise
and restrained language in the ASEAN regional investment treaties.127 Unlike
these provisions in the ASEAN regional investment treaties which are largely
confined to definitions of the treaty standards and express exclusions (e.g.,
ruling out subject matter not covered by the treaty standard), the RCEP draft
investment chapter provides determinative tests clearly intended to guide the
task of interpreting treaty standards. Similarly, the more recent ASEANHong Kong Investment Agreement followed the RCEP model by limiting the
application of MFN treatment with qualifications and determinative tests,128
123

Id. at 21–22.
CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.4 & n.14.
125
Id. art. 9.5, ¶ 3 (“For greater certainty, the treatment referred to in this Article does not encompass
international dispute resolution procedures or mechanisms, such as those included in Section B (InvestorState Dispute Settlement).”.
126
See Martins Paparinskis, MFN Clauses and International Dispute Settlement: Moving Beyond
Maffezini and Plama?, ICSID REV., Fall 2011, at 14.
127
See ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 5, 6, 11; ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22,
arts. 4, 6; ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 3–4, 6; ASEAN-India Investment
Agreement, supra note 25, arts. 3, 7; ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, arts. 4–5, 7.
128
See ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 4, ¶ 3(a), (b) (excluding MFN
treatment for “(a) preferential treatment accorded to investors or their investments under any existing
124
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as well as by providing for a much narrower scope to the protection afforded
under the fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) standard and full protection
and security (“FPS”) standard.129
C.

Exceptions, Reservations, and Other Host-State Calibration
Clauses

Similar to the ASEAN regional investment treaties’ detailed exceptions
provisions, reservations clauses, and other clauses intended to calibrate the
host-state’s regulatory discretion and policy space, 130 the RCEP draft
investment chapter contains extensive provisions designed to protect the hoststate’s right to regulate. These include more restrictions on the applicability
of the RCEP draft investment chapter, such as the right to exclude government
procurement measures, subsidies or grants; state aid or financial assistance in
pursuit of legitimate public purposes (such as health, safety, and the
environment); and taxation measures.131 The RCEP draft investment chapter
also contains a separate Article XX listing detailed reservations and nonconforming measures,132 legal justifications for host-states to restrict capital
transfers, 133 and a separate annex to clarify the rules on expropriation
(including tests for indirect expropriation).134 Unlike the ASEAN regional
investment treaties, the draft RCEP investment chapter does not contain
separate provisions on general exceptions and/or security exceptions. The
ASEAN regional investment treaties usually pattern these exceptions after
Article XX (General Exceptions) and Article XXI (Security Exceptions) of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).
bilateral, regional, or international agreements or arrangements or any forms of economic or regional
cooperation with any non-Party”; and “(b) any existing or future preferential treatment accorded to investors
or their investments under any agreement or arrangement between or among ASEAN Member States, or
between or among the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and other customs territories of the
People’s Republic of China”); id. art. 4, ¶ 5 (excluding MFN for dispute resolution procedures other than
those set out in this investment agreement).
129
Id. art. 5, ¶ 1(a) (“[FET] requires each Party not to deny justice in any legal or administrative
proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process of law”); id. art. 5, ¶ 1(b) (“[FPS] requires each
Party to take such measures as may be reasonably necessary for the physical protection and security of the
covered investment”); id. art. 5, ¶ 1(c) (“[T]he concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection
and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required under customary
international law, and do not create additional substantive rights”); id. art. 5, ¶ 2 (“[A] determination that
there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, does
not establish that there has been a breach of this Article”).
130
For a detailed discussion, see generally Desierto, supra note 17.
131
RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 2–4.
132
Id. at 27–30.
133
Id. at 30–35.
134
Id. at 42–45.
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In contrast, the CPTPP draft investment chapter does not make
extensive use of the above kinds of provisions to protect the host-state’s right
to regulate. Rather, it relies on a single provision in Article 9.16 of the
CPTPP, which does not specify the consequences for a host-state that invokes
its right to regulate in a manner that breaches investment treaty protection
standards. The provision states that “[n]othing in this Chapter shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining[,] or enforcing any
measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate
to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental, health, or other regulatory objectives.”135 It is not
clear from this provision if the host-state adopting, maintaining, or enforcing
its self-judged regulatory measure would be able to avoid or mitigate liability
for a breach of investment treaty standards. The CPTPP draft investment
chapter does not contain any general exceptions or security exceptions
clauses. This contrasts with several of ASEAN regional investment treaties
that also incorporate exceptions clauses modeled after GATT Article XX
(General Exceptions) and Article XXI (Security Exceptions).136
Exceptions clauses purposely grafted from GATT Articles XX and XXI
have not yet been interpreted in investor-state jurisprudence. The award in
Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina attempted to apply a GATT
Article XX-type meaning to a one-sentence non-precluded measures
clause. 137 However, that approach has been repeatedly critiqued 138 and
disregarded by most investment arbitral tribunals. The exceptions clauses in
the new ASEAN investment treaties are thus likely to be the most recent
examples of direct transposition of GATT law into investment treaty
practices. It would be well within the settled principles of treaty interpretation
in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 139 to
135

CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.16.
ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 17–18; ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, arts. 16–
17; ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 20, 21; ASEAN-India Investment Agreement,
supra note 25, arts. 21–22; ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, arts. 8–9.
137
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 20 (Sept. 5, 2008),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf (examining Article XI of the
Argentina-U.S. BIT).
138
See DIANE A. DESIERTO, NECESSITY AND NATIONAL EMERGENCY CLAUSES: SOVEREIGNTY IN
MODERN TREATY INTERPRETATION 171–83 (2012); Diane A. Desierto, Necessity and “Supplementary Means
of Interpretation” for Non-Precluded Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 827
(2010); José E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Continental Casualty v. Argentina,
in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2010–2011, at 320 (2012).
139
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31, 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
136

April 2018

ASEAN Investment Treaties

375

conduct some examination of GATT law and jurisprudence in interpreting the
provisions of GATT law grafted into the new ASEAN investment treaties.
While there might well be nothing extraordinary about incorporating
jurisprudential insights from trade law into investment treaty practices, 140
some caution may be warranted due to teleological and structural design
differences between the two treaty regimes. 141 The most fundamental
difference is a matter of remedy. World Trade Organization (“WTO”) law
requires the Member State to adjust its policies prospectively to maintain the
foreign market access guarantees built into the international trade treaties,
while investment law confers compensation to investors for past economic
injuries to their investment caused by a host-state’s measures.142 To the extent
that a WTO Member State can successfully persuade the WTO tribunals
(Panel or Appellate Body) that the contested measure falls within any of the
exceptions in GATT Articles XX or XXI, it would not have to revise the
measure at all.143
On the other hand, if a host-state were to successfully show that its
contested regulatory measure in an investor-state dispute falls within an
exception under the general exceptions or security exceptions clauses in the
new ASEAN investment treaties, would they foreclose any finding of the
existence of a breach of investment treaty protections (a first-order defense)?
Would they excuse, suspend, or mitigate compensatory redress available to
the investor (a second-order defense)? Would they bar recourse to investorstate dispute settlement (a third-order defense)? The exceptions clauses in
ASEAN regional investment treaties do not resolve any of these questions. It
is thus entirely reasonable to expect that foreign investors would not be likely
to bring their claims under the ASEAN regional investment treaties, where it
is not clear what the legal consequences are when a host-state invokes a
general exceptions clause or security exceptions clause in any of the ASEAN
regional investment treaties.

140

See, e.g., Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International
Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).
141
See Diane A. Desierto, Public Policy in International Investment and Trade Law: Community
Expectations and Functional Decision-Making, 26 FLA. J. INT’L L. 51 (2014).
142
Id. at 117–33.
143
For more on general exceptions and security exceptions, see PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW
AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 597–632 (1st ed. 2005).
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Finally, it should also be observed that the ASEAN regional investment
treaties expressly bar the application of the treaty to a closed list of Member
State measures. 144 These provisions in the ASEAN regional investment
treaties are difficult to reconcile given evolving understandings of the ordinary
scope of business practices. As with any other business entity, income from
investment operations (usually through onshore corporate activities in the
host-state) would generally be taxed (subject to any applicable tax treaties or
exemptions). Investment operations may likewise include dealing with local
entities that are supported by subsidies or grants from the host-state.
Additionally, investment operations may entail contemporary legal
configurations, such as “public-private partnerships,”145 for the delivery of
public goods and services, which would ordinarily be subject to government
procurement and bidding laws.146 Host-state measures in relation to trade in
services may likewise impact investment operations and overall profitability.
Carving out these areas automatically from the protective guarantees in the
ASEAN regional investment treaties conveys that foreign investors would not
be able to seek recourse under such treaties for a plethora of transactions (and
interactions with host-state measures) that ordinarily implicate investment
operations on a periodic basis.
Furthermore, the new ASEAN investment treaties contain detailed
reservations clauses, which are reflective of possible protectionist tendencies
and politically sensitive areas. 147 The ACIA acknowledges that national
treatment protection does not apply to measures indicated in the Schedule
attached to the ACIA (regardless of whether such measures arise from the

144

ACIA, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 1(a)–(e); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22,
art. 1, ¶ 2(a)–(c); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 3, ¶ 4(a)–(e); ASEAN-Korea
Investment Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 2, ¶ 2(a)–(f); ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note
25, art. 1, ¶¶ 2(a)–(d), 3; ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 2, ¶¶ 2(a)–(f), 3.
145
See Catherine Donnelly, Public-Private Partnerships: Award, Performance, and Remedies, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 476, 476–77 (Stephan W. Schill ed.,
2010) (“Currently, PPPs are used in various forms across the full gamut of governmental activities from the
traditional procurement context to complex externalization projects including infrastructure and construction,
collection of child support payments, management of the federal Medicare programme and state healthcare
programmes such as Medi-cal, federal student loan programmes, probationary services, schools, prisons, and
military services.”).
146
See ANNE DAVIES, ACCOUNTABILITY: A PUBLIC LAW ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT
19–26 (2001) (demonstrating the inevitable tensions between public interest concerns and government
contracting practices).
147
See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., PRESERVING FLEXIBILITY IN IIAS: THE USE OF
RESERVATIONS, at 39–45, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/8, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.14 (2006),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiit20058_en.pdf.
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central, regional, or local government). 148 The ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA
Investment Chapter likewise denies national treatment protection to various
measures indicated in two Schedules to Lists I and II to the treaty,149 while the
ASEAN-India Investment Agreement bars the application of national
treatment to measures maintained either at central, regional, or local levels of
government according to schedules of reservations. 150 The ASEAN-China
Investment Agreement denies national treatment and MFN treatment to “any
existing or new non-conforming measures maintained or adopted within its
territory” as well as the “continuation or amendment of any [such] nonconforming measures.”151 As the Agreement does not indicate or describe
which measures are deemed to be non-conforming, this potentially broad
carve out also does not appear to be subject to any legal obligation to revise
the measure to ensure conformity with the Agreement. At best, the States
Parties to the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement would simply “endeavor
to progressively remove the non-conforming measures.” 152 Finally, the
reservations clause in the ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement appears
more extensive than the other new ASEAN investment treaties. It denies
national treatment protection, MFN treatment protection, and the applicability
of rules on senior management and boards of directors to non-conforming
measures indicated in the Schedule of Reservations, continuation or prompt
renewal of any non-conforming measure, and amendments to such nonconforming measures.153 National treatment and MFN treatment is likewise
denied for measures set out in List 2, this time with respect to specified
sectors, sub-sectors, or activities.154
In principle, reservation clauses comprise fundamental treaty
mechanisms 155 that could guarantee ASEAN Member States and their
counterpart states in the new ASEAN investment treaties retain flexibility to
insulate certain government measures or areas of regulation from
subordination to international investment treaty obligations. Nevertheless,
Member States should also be aware of the corresponding administrative and
148

ACIA, supra note 21, art. 9.
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 12.
150
ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 4, ¶¶ 1–6.
151
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 6, ¶ 1(a), (b).
152
Id. art. 6, ¶ 2.
153
ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 9, ¶ 1.
154
Id. art. 9, ¶ 2.
155
VCLT, supra note 139, arts. 19–23. For an interesting historical account of reservations and the
interplay of state interests involved in crafting reservations into treaties, see Edward T. Swaine, Reserving,
31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307 (2006).
149
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institutional costs attendant to maintaining reservations to the new ASEAN
investment treaties.156 Reservations against investment treaty coverage that
are drawn too specifically and without the necessary adjustment and review
clauses may be difficult157 to withdraw or amend in the future. Such clauses
could hinder the ASEAN Economic Community’s evolution and development
of further investment objectives and policies, including investment promotion
plans, regulatory incentives, and other legal protections to attract more inward
direct investment to ASEAN.158 Investments in services sectors, for example,
which are often the subject of many reservations clauses in investment
treaties, could be the next frontier of expansion for the AEC.
Setting out descriptive lists of regulatory sectors and government
measures to which investment treaty protection standards would not apply
likewise interrelates the administrative function of treaty oversight with the
interpretive function of determining the scope of applicability of a legal
obligation (e.g., the investment treaty protection standard) to a given
transaction. Complex, multi-stage investment projects159 and the regulatory
umbrella that extends over the entire project or operation may not be easily
compartmentalized for an arbitral tribunal or local court tasked with deciding
an investor-state dispute. A reservations clause may apply to one aspect of
the investment project and not the other, but the investor injury asserted may
be integral or holistic in nature (e.g., a drop in shareholding prices for the
holding company that manages the complex, multi-stage investment project).
To the extent that the ASEAN regional investment treaties deliberately
reserve various measures and sectors from treaty protection, a counterpart
institutional or administrative structure within the ASEAN Secretariat/CCI
may also be necessary to monitor and contextualize the implementation of
these clauses.
The ASEAN regional investment treaties also contain virtually
identical language with respect to permissible restrictions on capital transfers
and measures to safeguard balance of payments. A treaty party could “prevent
or delay a transfer” upon the nondiscriminatory and good-faith application of
156

RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 70.
See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, Guide to Practice on
Reservations to Treaties, art. 2.5, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011), reprinted in [2011] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1,
22, A/CN.4/SER.A/2011/Add.1 (Part 2).
158
For more on measures for encouraging inward direct investment, see PETER T. MUCHLINSKI,
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES & THE LAW 216–62 (2d ed. 2007).
159
See ASWATH DAMODARAN, THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING YOUNG, DISTRESSED, AND
COMPLEX BUSINESSES 125–26 (2d ed. 2009).
157
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its domestic laws, such as those on bankruptcy, securities regulation, criminal
offences, financial reporting, enforcement of administrative or judicial
decisions, taxation, social security, labor claims, and other domestic
requirements by central banks or other relevant authorities that would permit
restrictions on transfers.160 Further non-conforming measures may also be
contemplated in “exceptional circumstances” such as “serious economic or
financial disturbance” or other similar balance of payments difficulties. 161
These provisions permit the Member States to impose restrictions on capital
transactions and transfers relating to covered investments in development or
financial crises situations that are largely self-judged162 by the Member States.
The desire to maintain governmental control over monetary flows, even while
attempting to liberalize investment, is particularly understandable for a region
that bore the brunt of the Asian financial crisis.163 However, these provisions
also introduce unpredictability to the overall quality of investment protection
afforded by the new ASEAN investment treaties. Member States have
complete discretion to determine whether any given fiscal, financial,
economic, or developmental situation warrants intervention into the free flow
of capital transactions and transfers. Furthermore, the new ASEAN
investment treaties do not afford any direct investor recourse against the
potential arbitrariness, illegality, or inconsistency of a Member State’s capital
and transfer restrictions. At best, the ASEAN-India Investment Agreement
calls for joint consultations between treaty parties to review such transfer
restrictions.164 Even if the measures to safeguard the balance of payments are
required to be “consistent” with the International Monetary Fund’s (“IMF”)
Articles of Agreement, the investment treaty provisions remain the controlling

160

Article 13 of the ACIA, supra note 21, contains substantially the same, if not identical, language as
Article 8 (“Transfers”) of the ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22; Article 10
(“Transfers and Repatriation of Profits”) of the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23; Article
10 (“Transfers”) of the ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24; and Article 11 of the ASEANIndia Investment Agreement, supra note 25.
161
Article 16 of the ACIA, supra note 21, contains substantially the same, if not identical, language as
Article 11 (“Temporary Safeguard Measures”) in the ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24;
Article 11 (“Measures to Safeguard the Balance of Payments”) in the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement,
supra note 23; and Article 12 (“Temporary Safeguard Measures”) in the ASEAN-India Investment
Agreement, supra note 25. The ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22; and the ASEANJapan FTA, supra note 52, do not contain any such provisions.
162
See Stephan Schill & Robyn Briese, “If the State Considers”: Self-Judging Clauses in International
Dispute Settlement, 13 U.N.Y.B. 61 (2009).
163
See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley, Origins of the Crisis in Asia, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS:
ORIGINS, IMPLICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 27 (William C. Hunter et al. eds., 1999).
164
ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 12, ¶¶ 5–6.
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lex specialis.165 Since the new ASEAN investment treaties leave it entirely to
the Member States to police the mode and manner of their imposition of
capital transfer restrictions (e.g., leaving it to the treaty party to determine
when an economic, fiscal, financial, or developmental situation warrants such
restrictions, as well as letting the treaty party decide on the proportionality,
duration, and termination of such restrictions), one can anticipate that
investors would have to forecast higher risks to their investment because of
the increased uncertainty whenever an ASEAN Member State imposes
restrictions on capital transfers.166
The ASEAN regional investment treaties feature unique provisions
addressing the development concerns between the different ASEAN Member
States. The newer ASEAN Member States—Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and
Vietnam—benefit from different expectations of compliance with the new
ASEAN investment treaties. The ACIA recognizes that “commitments by
each newer ASEAN Member State may be made in accordance with its
individual stage of development.” 167 Similar formulations appear in the
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter,168 the ASEAN-Korea Investment
Agreement, 169 the ASEAN-Japan Investment Chapter, 170 the ASEAN-India
Investment Agreement, 171 and the ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment
Agreement. 172 Special and differential treatment (“SDT”) is a familiar
principle in world trade law that permits developing countries to adjust
policies to conform to trade commitments at a different pace and schedule

165
See Abba Kolo, Transfer of Funds: the Interaction between the IMF Articles of Agreement and
Modern Investment Treaties: A Comparative Law Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 343, 362–68 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2011).
166
See Diane A. Desierto & Desiree A. Desierto, Investment Pricing and Social Protection: A Proposal
for an ICESCR-Adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model, 28 ICSID REV. 405 (2013), for an econometric
proposal on how to adjust risk estimations for cost of equity in view of host-states’ good faith implementation
of social protection measures.
167
ACIA, supra note 21, art. 23, ¶ 1(c).
168
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 15, ¶ 1(d).
169
ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 16, ¶ 1(d) (recognizing that commitments
by each new ASEAN Member State can be made in line with its respective development policies and
strategies).
170
While the SDT provision does not appear in Article 51—the single investment provision—of the
ASEAN-Japan FTA, SDT is provided for in Article 2, Paragraph 1(c) (“Principles”), which is not contained
in the investment chapter. ASEAN-Japan FTA, supra note 52, art. 2, ¶ 1(c) (“[S]pecial and differential
treatment is accorded to ASEAN Member States, especially the newer ASEAN Member States, in recognition
of their different levels of economic development; additional flexibility is accorded to the newer ASEAN
Member States”).
171
ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 16.
172
ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 18.
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than other WTO members.173 However, the incorporation of this provision in
investment treaties is a relatively recent phenomenon. 174 SDT provisions
have not yet been interpreted in investor-state jurisprudence. The operation
of the SDT principle in the new ASEAN investment treaties will foreseeably
create administrative as well as interpretive ambiguities for counterpart treaty
parties in the new ASEAN investment treaties. This is due to the lack of
monitoring mechanisms and usual schedules of compliance given to other
Member States by the developing countries covered by the SDT principle in
world trade law. While the WTO Secretariat has already taken an interpretive
position on the content of the SDT principle in various trade agreements,175
none of the ASEAN Member States or their regional investment treaty
partners have articulated their understanding of the application of the SDT
principle in the ASEAN regional investment treaties to expectations of CMLV
compliance.
To the extent that Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam would be
able to invoke the SDT principle to adjust their mode and manner of
compliance with investment treatment obligations and other provisions of
investment protection in the new ASEAN investment treaties, there should be
a mechanism for investors and their home states to anticipate, track, and
monitor the changed quality of compliance for the newer ASEAN Member
States. If the SDT principle is envisaged to be an available defense in an
investor-state dispute, would it operate to prevent investment treaty breaches
from arising in the first place, suspend the binding effect of investment treaty
protective guarantees, or simply mitigate any potential liabilities? None of
the ASEAN regional investment treaties clarify the precise legal effect of an
SDT principle. Considering that the CMLV countries nevertheless retain
individual BIT programs, it is reasonable to expect that foreign investors
would prefer to use BITs of the CMLV countries, which generally do not
contain any equivocal language on treaty compliance such as the SDT
principle.

173
SONIA E. ROLLAND, Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO Agreements: A Legal Analysis,
in DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 109 (2012).
174
See Peter T. Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 4, 36–38 (Peter T. Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
175
See Committee on Trade and Development, Note by the Secretariat: Special and Differential
Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/W/196 (June 14, 2013).
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Transparency Requirements and Monitoring Institutions

The draft RCEP investment chapter contains various transparency
requirements and incorporates rules on transparency for its investor-State
dispute settlement provisions consistent with the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Rules on Transparency. 176
Unlike the ASEAN regional investment treaties, however, the draft RCEP
investment chapter does not contain separate obligations on information
transparency and notification of regulatory changes to fellow treaty parties. It
does not create a standing treaty monitoring committee or body, but only a
“Committee for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.”177 The draft CPTPP
investment chapter likewise does not impose detailed transparency
requirements, other than to recognize that:
[A] Party may require an investor of another Party or its covered
investment to provide information concerning that investment
solely for informational or statistical purposes. The Party shall
protect such information that is confidential from any disclosure
that would prejudice the competitive position of the investor or
the covered investment. Nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed to prevent a Party from otherwise obtaining or
disclosing information in connection with the equitable and good
faith application of its law.178
The draft CPTPP investment chapter instead provides for more extensive rules
on transparency of arbitral proceedings, open hearings, and public access to
information produced in the arbitral proceedings.179
In contrast, and unlike the usual models of older generations of BITs,
the ASEAN regional investment treaties reflect the ASEAN Member States’
desire to retain a broader scope of public policy discretion.180 Many of the
ASEAN regional investment treaties’ provisions appear to have been grafted
from world trade and WTO law, such as GATT Article XX exceptions that
176

RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 51, 66.
Id. at 70.
178
CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.14, ¶ 2.
179
Id. art. 9.24.
180
Indonesia has thus far announced its intention to revise its BIT program. See Grace D. Amianti,
Govt Revises Investment Treaties, JAKARTA POST (May 12, 2015), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/
2015/05/12/govt-revises-investment-treaties.html.
177
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would ordinarily call for a state to calibrate or change a trade-restrictive
measure, but which are instead built into an investment treaty to foreclose any
state’s liability for breach of investor protections. 181 There is also a
proliferation of many self-judged provisions that would enable any ASEAN
Member State to opt out of usual investor treatment protections, such as
protections for free transferability of capital, without consent of other treaty
parties,182 as well as provisions referring to “non-discriminatory regulatory
actions by a Party designed and applied to achieve legitimate public welfare
objectives, including the protection of public health, safety, and the
environment,” which are deemed not to constitute expropriation.183 There are
numerous extensive regional transparency requirements on investors,184 but
no guarantee to those investors of a centralized regional repository of
investment regulatory information (e.g., on admission of investments,
regulatory treatment, and oversight of foreign investments, or potential
sources of changes to the regulatory framework applicable to foreign
investment). Perhaps most unique among multi-party investment treaties,185
the ASEAN regional investment treaties contain explicit provisions on
“special and differentiated treatment” 186 for CMLV, the newer ASEAN
Member States, which do not specify the extent to which these states are

181

See Diane A. Desierto, ‘For Greater Certainty’: Balancing Economic Integration and Investor
Protection in the New ASEAN Investment Agreements, TRANSNAT’L DISPUTE MGMT., no. 5, 2011, at 1, for a
detailed dissection of all the public policy provisions across the ASEAN regional investment treaties. See
also Desierto, supra note 42, 188–89.
182
See ACIA, supra note 21, art. 13, ¶ 3 (permitting a host-state to delay an investor’s capital transfers
due to self-judged economic emergencies); id. art. 16 (allowing restrictions on transfers and payments due to
measures taken by a host-state to safeguard its balance of payments); id. art. 17 (“General Exceptions”); id.
art. 18 (“Security Exceptions”); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 3 (permitting
delay of investor’s transfers in enumerated domestic situations); ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement,
supra note 24, art. 10, ¶ 2 (permitting delay of investor’s transfers); id. art. 20 (“General Exceptions”); id.
art. 21 (“Security Exceptions”); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 11, ¶ 1 (permitting
restrictions on investments and transfers as a measure to safeguard the balance of payments); id. art. 16
(“General Exceptions”); id. art. 17 (“Security Exceptions”).
183
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, annex, ¶ 4; ACIA, supra note 21, annex
2, ¶ 4.
184
ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 20, 21; ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, arts.
11, 14; ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 8, 15; ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement, supra note 23, art. 19.
185
For example, see Investment Agreement for the 2007 COMESA Common Investment Area, May
23, 2007, http://www.tralac.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/Investment_agreement_for_
the_CCIA.pdf (comprising Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe), which does not provide for any special and differentiated treatment principle.
186
ACIA, supra note 21, art. 23; ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 15;
ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 16.
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permitted to derogate from investor protections in the ASEAN regional
investment treaties.
The new ASEAN investment treaties generally make it obligatory for
the Member States to notify and publicize laws, regulations, administrative
guidelines, and other commitments that would affect covered investments,
while at the same time allowing Member States to withhold confidential
information that, in their view, would prejudice public interests. The ACIA
obligates the Member States to at least annually inform the AIA Council of
“any investment-related agreements or arrangements . . . where preferential
treatment was granted,” 187 as well as “any new law or of any changes to
existing laws, regulations, or administrative guidelines, which significantly
affect investments or commitments of a Member State.” 188 The Member
States are further obligated to “make publicly available, all relevant laws,
regulations[,] and administrative guidelines of general application that pertain
to, or affect investments in the territory of the Member State,”189 and, more
importantly, to designate an “enquiry point” 190 for such information. A
Member State may “require an investor of another Member State, or a covered
investment, to provide information concerning the investment solely for
informational or statistical purposes.”191 However, the Member States retain
the prerogative to restrict disclosure of information in the interests of law
enforcement, public interest, and the legitimate commercial interests of
particular public or private juridical persons.192
The ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter contains similar
transparency rules and restrictive disclosure rules as the ACIA,193 but extends
transparency rules to administrative proceedings relating to the application of
all host-state measures of general application covered in the treaty.194 The
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, 195 the ASEAN-Korea Investment
Agreement, 196 and the ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement 197 all
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

ACIA, supra note 21, art. 21, ¶ 1(a).
Id. art. 21, ¶ 1(b).
Id. art. 21, ¶ 1(c).
Id. art. 21, ¶ 1(d).
Id. art. 20, ¶ 2.
Id. art. 21, ¶ 2; id. art. 20, ¶ 2.
See ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 13, ¶¶ 1–8.
Id. art. 13, ¶¶ 9–12.
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 19, ¶¶ 1–3.
ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 8.
ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 7.
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contain transparency rules and restrictive disclosure rules similarly worded to
those found in the ACIA. The ASEAN-India Investment Agreement contains
similar transparency rules, but also explicitly requires that treaty parties
“notify the other Parties through the ASEAN Secretariat at least once annually
of any investment-related agreements or arrangements which grants any
preferential treatment and to which it is a party.”198
It is laudable that the new ASEAN investment treaties have embraced
the principle of transparency to ensure regulatory accountability and
improvement of the Member States’ collective investment environments.199
Yet, the overall effectiveness of the transparency guarantees could be
undermined by Member States’ discretion to restrict or prohibit disclosures
that, in their view, would be prejudicial to public interest, law enforcement,
or legitimate commercial interests. Absent a treaty mechanism for testing the
legality of the host-state’s restriction on the disclosure of information to
investors or fellow Member States, non-enforcement may altogether
counteract the obligatory quality of the transparency rules. Investment
arbitration jurisprudence accepts the transparency principle as the basis for
investors to expect that a host-state would act:
[I]n a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it
may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will
govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant
policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to
plan its investment and comply with such regulations. Any and
all State actions conforming to such criteria should relate not
only to the guidelines, directives or requirements issued, or the
resolutions approved hereunder, but also to the goals underlying
such regulations . . . .200

198

ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 14, ¶ 1(c).
See Akira Kotera, Regulatory Transparency, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 174, at 617, 627–28.
200
Champion Trading Co. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Award, ¶ 162 (Oct.
27, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0148.pdf; see also R.R. Dev. Corp.
v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23, Award, ¶ 219 (June 29, 2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1051.pdf; Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 76 (Aug. 25, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001); Saluka Invs. B.V.
v. Czech Republic, Case No. 2001-04, Partial Award, ¶¶ 420–25 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/880.
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The broad restrictive disclosure carve-outs for the ASEAN Member States
within the new ASEAN investment treaties, which are not susceptible to
compulsory oversight or review by either investors or fellow Member States,
would ultimately make it all too easy to defeat this principle. As seen from
the analysis of the foregoing eight common public policy features of the new
ASEAN investment treaties, there is little safeguard against a Member State
exercising unconstrained discretion to unilaterally opt out of complying with
investment protection obligations. Neither is there any reassurance of an open
regulatory and information structure that would enable a continuing dialogue
between the Member States on their mutual exercise of public policy
prerogatives that might weaken or altogether undercut the qualitative
protections offered in the new ASEAN investment treaties. This could lead
foreign investors to apply older generations of Southeast Asian BITs, which
contain fewer regulatory carve-outs favoring host-states.
The main remedy for ensuring regular implementation of the public
policy provisions without regulatory uncertainty or unfettered discretion of
ASEAN Member States is to ensure transparency and liberalize access to
information. Foreign investors cannot realistically expect laws, regulations,
and policies in ASEAN Member States to remain unchanged and static during
the life of the investment. However, foreign investors’ expectations of the
investment risks and returns with regard to ASEAN are inevitably affected by
perceptions of the “regulatory restrictiveness” within individual ASEAN
Member States. 201 Regulatory uncertainty can be mitigated if foreign
investors and the ASEAN Member States regularly exchange and update
information on all laws, policies, and regulations that affect the establishment,
admission, and implementation of investment.202
The new ASEAN regional investment treaties require various indices
of domestic information in relation to ASEAN Member States’ respective
domestic legal requirements and measures applicable to the investment during
201

“Regulatory restrictiveness” is measured according to various variables and different methodologies
aiming to capture the conduciveness of a country or region to foreign investment. See, e.g., FDI Regulatory
Restrictiveness Index, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/
investment/fdiindex.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2018); see also Protectionism, INT’L CHAMBER COM.,
http://www.iccwbo.org/global-influence/g20/reports-and-products/open-markets-index/ (last visited Feb. 25,
2018).
202
See Press Release, Council for Asset and Inv. Mgmt., Inst. Int’l Fin., Top 10 Impediments to LongTerm Infrastructure Financing and Investment (June 2014), https://www.iif.com/system/files/CAIM_
Top_10_Impediments_to_LT_Investment_1.pdf (“Concerns about investor/creditor rights, as well as
potential changes to the regulatory and policy framework over time can discourage long-term investment.”).
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the life of the investment. If deliberately or negligently denied by ASEAN
Member States to a foreign investor, these could also likely give rise to a
separate actionable claim based on transparency obligations under the
ASEAN regional investment treaties. 203 The same treaties also contain
procedural transparency rules applicable to investor-state disputes, such as
those involving the participation of amicus curiae and access to information
by non-disputing parties, among others, which are not uniformly granted in
investor-state arbitral jurisprudence.204 Such information is not only owed to
foreign investors but also to fellow ASEAN Member States to ensure Member
States are compliant with obligations to foreign investors under these regional
treaties.205 These requirements are specified under each regional investment
treaty and not standardized in a separate treaty, such as the 2014 UN
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration
(otherwise known as the “Mauritius Convention”).206 Because each regional
treaty has its own corresponding institutional monitoring body as discussed in
Part I.B., it will be critical for each of the Member States to regularly
coordinate such information with ASEAN counter-parties and fellow ASEAN
Member States whose nationals are also entitled to such information.
Domestic measures will more than likely vary between and across ASEAN
Member States, since domestic foreign investment legislation and policy
remains a matter for the ASEAN Member States’ respective national
competencies.
Given these regulatory disparities in access to information, it would
best serve the interests of ASEAN Member States to ensure that the ASEAN
203

See Champion Trading Co., Award, ¶ 162 (affirming that an investor could expect the host-state to
act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity, and provide a transparent regime for its investment, both as
a matter of investment treaty obligation as well as on the basis of a separate international law principle on
transparency).
204
See Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw, supra note 174, at 725; Aguas Argentinas, S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus
Curiae, ¶¶ 4–7, 21–23 (May 19, 2005), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
ita0815.pdf (denying a request to attend hearings of the case, but granting a request for leave to make amicus
curiae submissions).
205
See, e.g., ACIA, supra note 21, art. 25, ¶ 1(e) (describing the duty of all ASEAN Member States to
cooperate on investment facilitation by “strengthening databases on all forms of investments for policy
formulation to improve ASEAN’s investment environment”); id. art. 26, ¶ 1(c) (describing the duty of all
ASEAN Member States to “share information on investment policies and best practices, including promoted
activities and industries”).
206
United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 2014, 541 I.L.M. 751 (entered into force Oct. 18, 2017); see also G.A. Res. 68/109,
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration and Arbitration Rules (Dec.
16, 2013).
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CCI provide a “one-stop shop” or investment information clearinghouse,
similar to those implemented by the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”) Commission 207 and the Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (“COMESA”) Regional Investment Agency.208
E.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement Options

The draft RCEP investment chapter provides for three key dispute
settlement options: consultations, negotiations, and arbitration. The bulk of
the draft devotes the most attention to the rules for the conduct of arbitration
proceedings.209 The provisions resemble the investor-state dispute settlement
options in most of the ASEAN regional investment treaties. 210 The 2017
ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement left its investor-state dispute
settlement options to future agreement of the parties. 211 The CPTPP draft
investment chapter likewise leaves out any definitive investor-state dispute
settlement option.
While dispute settlement is an area of ASEAN investment rule-making
that is still shrouded in uncertainty, some observations can be made about the
dispute settlement options adopted in the ASEAN regional investment
treaties. First, despite certain criticisms of the structure, design, and
interpretive approaches of arbitral tribunals in the investor-state dispute
settlement system,212 ASEAN has not repudiated investor-state arbitration as
one of its investor-state dispute settlement options. The ACIA provides for
conciliation procedures, consultations, and submission of investor claims
207

See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, NAFTA Commission Announces New
Transparency Measures (Oct. 7, 2003), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/
archives/2003/october/nafta-commission-announces-new-transparen.
208
See
About
Us:
COMESA
RIA,
COMESA
REGIONAL
INV.
AGENCY,
http://www.comesaria.org/site/en/article.php?chaine=comesa-ria&id_article=56 (last visited Feb. 25, 2018)
(“[The COMESA] RIA provides a platform for private sector to interact with COMESA Governments and
serves as an information hub through which it can promote the COMESA region, detailed information on
legislation and policies affecting the business environment, cost of doing business, investment incentives,
investment procedures, investment opportunities and projects, major events affecting investment and other
relevant information. In doing so, RIA works closely with Member States’ Investment Promotion Agencies
(IPAs) to promote the COMESA region as a Common Investment Area, and in building a positive image of
the region and its Member States for a worldwide audience.”).
209
RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 45–70.
210
See ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, arts. 13–14; ASEAN-Korea Investment
Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 18–19; ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, arts. 18–
28; ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, arts. 19–20; ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 28–41.
211
ASEAN-Hong Kong Investment Agreement, supra note 26, art. 20.
212
See generally RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: JOURNEYS FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
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against host-states to arbitration. 213 The ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement mandates initial consultations to resolve disputes between
investors and host-states, and should such consultations fail, the investor is
given the choice of local court adjudication, administrative tribunals,
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
arbitration, UNCITRAL arbitration, or arbitration administered by any other
institution under any other rules. 214 The ASEAN-India Investment
Agreement provides for a similar extensive choice of forum for investors, but
contains strict conditions and limitations to the submission of investor
claims. 215 The ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement requires mandatory
consultations and negotiations within a six month period before the investor
can submit his or her claim against the host-state to ICSID arbitration, ICSID
Additional Facility Rules arbitration, UNCITRAL arbitration, or any other
arbitration institution, or to local courts or administrative tribunals.216 The
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter provides for consultations before
an investor can choose to submit a claim to local courts or tribunals, ICSID
arbitration, ICSID Additional Facility Rules arbitration, UNCITRAL
arbitration, or any other arbitration institution under any other arbitration
rules.217
Second, it is significant that ASEAN has not built in specific
preferences for arbitral institutions within ASEAN Member States, such as
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (“SIAC”), the Kuala Lumpur
Regional Centre for Arbitration (“KLRCA”) in Malaysia, the Badan Arbitrasi
Nasional Indonesia (“BANI”) Arbitration Centre in Indonesia, the Philippine
Dispute Resolution Centre Inc. (“PDRCI”) in Manila, or the Thai Arbitration
Institute. Of these arbitral institutions, SIAC has grown rapidly in the last
decade, making it one of the world’s foremost dispute resolution hubs. 218
With the proliferation of arbitration centers in Southeast Asia, several of
which are government-supported, it is not surprising that ASEAN’s regional
investment treaties continue to emphasize resort to investor-state arbitration
as the preferred dispute settlement option. It is more surprising that ASEAN
regional investment treaties do not specify any of Southeast Asia’s renowned
213

ACIA, supra note 21, arts. 30–41.
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 14, ¶¶ 1–10.
215
ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25, art. 20, ¶¶ 1–31.
216
ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 18, ¶¶ 1–14.
217
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, arts. 19–21.
218
See Laura Philomin, Singapore to Remake Itself as Asia’s Legal Hub with New Commercial Court,
REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2014, 2:13 PM), https://in.reuters.com/article/singapore-law/singapore-to-remake-itselfas-asias-legal-hub-with-new-commercial-court-idINDEEA1A0JC20140211.
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regional arbitration centers, but do explicitly provide for the World Bank’s
ICSID arbitration.
Third, the linguistic, cultural, political, economic, and institutional
capacity diversity of court systems in the ten ASEAN Member States create
additional incentives for foreign investors to insist on submitting their
disputes to international arbitration. ASEAN Member States’ court systems
are not all equally or fully prepared to handle complex regional investments
and the economic disputes that arise from the influx of cross-border
transactions.219 In this sense, international arbitration may supply investor
confidence in stable dispute settlement mechanisms for complex foreign
investment disputes, even as ASEAN Member States (especially the CMLV
countries) continue to build national judicial capacities for resolving ASEANlaw-based disputes.
Finally, it should be noted that ASEAN is not, as of this writing,
pursuing any regional investment court or regional institutional appellate
mechanism to handle investor-state disputes. Consistent with the mandate of
the ASEAN Charter, the implementation of ASEAN law (e.g., treaties,
commitments, and ASEAN Summit decisions, among others) remains a
matter for the individual ASEAN Member States to ensure in their respective
jurisdictions. 220 The absence of any centralized regional enforcement
mechanism for arbitral awards based on the ASEAN regional investment
treaties could militate against the investors’ popular use of these treaties when
bringing claims against ASEAN Member States.
IV.

HARMONIZATION AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN
INVESTMENT POLICIES

It is not unusual for a state to adopt different investment treaty strategies
with different counterpart states. However, Southeast Asian states should be
concerned with the chaos arising from ASEAN’s multiple approaches to its
treaty commitments under ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP
draft investment chapter, and the CPTPP draft investment chapter. These
unmonitored differences impact the ability of ASEAN Member States to
effectively implement these investment treaty commitments in a way that is
in line with their fundamental obligations under the ASEAN Charter. Under
219

See Rule of Law in ASEAN: Not All Appealing, ASEAN BRIEFING (June 17, 2015),
https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2015/06/17/rule-of-law-in-asean-not-all-appealing-2.html.
220
ASEAN Charter art. 5, ¶ 2.
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Article 5(2) of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN’s treaties form part of ASEAN
law, such that ASEAN Member States “shall take all necessary measures,
including the enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively
implement the provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of
membership.”221 “Obligations of membership”—a phrase undefined under
the ASEAN Charter—may be reasonably viewed as the “rules of the
organization” in ASEAN. The International Law Commission’s 2011 Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations defines “rules of
the organization” as “the constituent instruments, decisions, resolutions[,] and
other acts of the international organization adopted in accordance with those
instruments, and established practice of the organization.”222
Furthermore, the ASEAN regional investment treaties comprise
decisions of the ASEAN Summit members—the individual heads of state of
the Member States of ASEAN—to commit to fulfill binding international
obligations in regard to the management of foreign investment with each other
and other states among ASEAN’s external partners.223 Moreover, the ASEAN
regional investment treaties are also binding on all ASEAN Member States as
part of the wider corpus of external agreements concluded under “the
centrality of ASEAN in external political, economic, social[,] and cultural
relations,”224 consistent with its objectives of “upholding . . . international
law” 225 and adhering to “ASEAN’s rules-based regimes for effective
implementation of economic commitments.” 226 Because of the positive
mandate of ASEAN Member States to “take all necessary measures” to
comply with obligations of membership, such as those contained in the
ASEAN regional investment treaties, each ASEAN Member State may well
find itself obligated to take all necessary measures to ensure that its other
investment treaty commitments—such as those in RCEP and the CPTPP—do
not undermine ASEAN Member States’ implementation of, and compliance
with, the ASEAN regional investment treaties.
221

Id.
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, Draft Articles on the Responsibility
of International Organizations, with Commentaries, art. 2, ¶ 1(b), U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (2011), reprinted in
[2011] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1, 46, A/CN.4/SER.A/2011/Add.1 (Part 2).
223
Cf. SALACUSE, supra note 84, at 13 (“[Investment] treaty texts contain many specific prescriptions
for action. Thus, in addition to norms, the treaties express rules about such matters as expropriation, monetary
transfers, and compensation of injured investors because of war, revolution, and civil strife.”).
224
ASEAN Charter art. 2, ¶ 2(m); see also MARISE CREMONA ET AL., ASEAN’S EXTERNAL
AGREEMENTS: LAW, PRACTICE AND THE QUEST FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 23–51 (2015).
225
ASEAN Charter art. 2, ¶ 2(j).
226
Id. art. 2, ¶ 2(n).
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As members of the AEC, ASEAN Member States continue to be bound
by their collective duties under the AEC Blueprint to create “more transparent,
consistent and predictable investment rules, regulations, policies[,] and
procedures.”227 The following subsections discuss problems arising from the
absence of substantive harmonization, institutional monitoring, and regional
coordination when implementing ASEAN’s regional investment
commitments in the ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft
investment chapter, and the CPTPP draft investment chapter.
A.

Inconsistent Formulation of Foreign Investment Treaty
Standards in Southeast Asia

ASEAN Member States can potentially undermine implementation of,
and compliance with, the ASEAN regional investment treaties through their
respective investment treaty commitments in new investment treaty
obligations, such as those anticipated in RCEP and CPTPP. One way is by
maintaining less stringent conditions in these other treaties that pose fewer
regulatory burdens on foreign investors, who would practice “jurisdictional”
or “regulatory” arbitrage.228 The ASEAN-India Investment Agreement or the
ACIA, for example, which contain more public policy clauses and host-state
defenses, could fall into desuetude should investors prefer to bring claims
under the RCEP or CPTPP (which, to date, do not have as many of these
clauses, reservations, exceptions, or host-state defenses). Southeast Asia
investment policy, as contained in the ASEAN regional investment treaties,
might aspire for the highest “gold” standard in investment protection and
public interest protection. Yet, if investors can still avail themselves of other
regional investment treaties, such as RCEP and CPTPP, which have far fewer
public interest provisions, the ASEAN regional investment treaties may end
up being relics of scholarly analysis rather than actual dispute settlement.
There is a need to undertake regular, close analysis of individual ASEAN
Member States’ future commitments in RCEP and CPTPP to determine if the
lower regulatory or compliance burdens in these treaties will end up
incentivizing foreign investors to choose regulatory arbitrage and invoke
compliance with the RCEP and CPTPP, rather than the stricter thresholds of
227

AEC Blueprint 2007, supra note 62, ¶ 28.
See NICHOLAS DORN, DEMOCRACY AND DIVERSITY IN FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION 67 (2015)
(“Jurisdictional arbitrage (alternatively, regulatory arbitrage) refers to financial firms moving from one
market to another—or conducting particular forms of business in or through some jurisdictions rather than
others—because of perceived advantages vis-à-vis regulation in or between jurisdictions . . . . [J]urisdictional
arbitrage requires as its condition of existence that jurisdictions differ in their rules.”).
228
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the ASEAN regional investment treaties, which afford more space for public
policy protection.
The problem worsens when we shift our analytical lens. ASEAN
Member States not only have investment treaty commitments under the
ASEAN regional investment treaties and potential future commitments in the
RCEP or CPTPP draft investment chapters, but all ten of the ASEAN Member
States have pre-existing BIT programs (numbering around 600 BITs and FTA
investment chapters in total for all ten ASEAN Member States). There
remains a glaring difference in the narrow formulation of the FET clause
under the ASEAN regional investment treaties and the broader variants in
several Southeast Asian BITs. Article 11, Paragraph 2(a) of the ACIA
obligates ASEAN Member States to observe FET towards foreign investors
by merely requiring “each Member State not to deny justice in any legal or
administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due
process.” 229 Many Southeast Asian BITs, however, do not narrowly
circumscribe FET in this manner.230 The 1994 Malaysia-Albania BIT states
that the “Contracting Party shall receive treatment which is fair and
equitable,”231 without explaining or interpreting the qualitative contours of
this treatment. The 1999 Argentina-Philippines BIT states that “[e]ach
Contracting Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment of the
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair
the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment[,] or disposal thereof through
unjustified or discriminatory measures.”232 Because of the more expansive
formulations of FET in the Southeast Asian BITs, the ASEAN Member States
remain bound to a stricter threshold of investment guarantees of “fair and
equitable treatment.” This is contrasted with the narrow scope of treatment
owed to investors under the ASEAN regional investment treaties. It will not
be surprising, therefore, if foreign investors claiming compensation for injury
caused by ASEAN Member States would prefer a more expansive version of
229

ACIA, supra note 21, art. 11, ¶ 2(a); see also ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25,
art. 7, ¶ 2(a); ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 6, ¶ 2(a); ASEAN-Korea
Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 5, ¶ 2(a); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23,
art. 7, ¶ 2(a).
230
See Jonathan Brenner et al., Handbook on Southeast Asian BITs app. A (spring 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
231
Agreement Between the Government of Malaysia the Government of the Republic of Albania for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 3, ¶ 1, Alb.-Malay., Jan. 24, 1994,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/22.
232
Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
Argentine Republic on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. 3, ¶ 1, Arg.-Phil., Sept.
20, 1999, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/112.
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FET in the Southeast Asian BITs, rather than invoking the ASEAN regional
investment treaties. It will thus be necessary to examine all Southeast Asian
investment treaties and their interaction with the ASEAN regional investment
treaties, the RCEP draft investment chapter, and the CPTPP draft investment
chapter. Doing so can help ASEAN anticipate and fully map the
consequences of Southeast Asia’s inconsistent formulation of foreign
investment treaty standards.
B.

The Problem of MFN Clauses in Southeast Asia Investment
Treaties

The RCEP draft investment chapter contains an MFN treatment clause,
which, interestingly, attempts to carve out pre-existing preferential
arrangements in other treaties from coverage under MFN treatment:
1.
Each Party shall accord to investors of another/any other
Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to investors of any other Party or . . . non-Party
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments in its territory.
2.
Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment
no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to
investments in its territory of investors of any other Party or . . .
of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other
disposition of investments in its territory.
3.
The treatment, as set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2, shall not
include:
a) any preferential treatment accorded to investors and/or
their investments under any existing bilateral, regional
and/or international agreements or any forms of economic
or regional cooperation with any non-Party; and
b) any existing or future preferential treatment accorded
to investors and/or their investments in any agreement or
arrangement between or among ASEAN Member States.
4.
Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, if a Party accords
more favourable treatment to investors of any other Party or a
non-Party of their investments by virtue of any future agreements
or arrangements to which the Party is a party, it shall not be

April 2018

ASEAN Investment Treaties

395

obliged to accord such treatment to investors of any other Party
or their investments. However, upon request from any other
Party, it shall accord adequate opportunity to negotiate the
benefits therein.
5.
For greater certainty, the . . . treatment referred to in this
Article does not encompass a requirement for a Party to extend
to investors of another Party any international dispute resolution
procedures or mechanisms such as those included in Section
B . . . of this Chapter.233
The CPTPP draft investment chapter does not contain a similar carve-out
against the applicability of MFN clauses to pre-existing treaty commitments
of ASEAN Member States. It simply rules out international dispute resolution
procedures or mechanisms from MFN coverage.234 There are MFN clauses
in several of the ASEAN regional investment treaties,235 as well as in many of
the Southeast Asian investment treaties and FTA investment chapters.
The MFN clause in investment treaties is particularly controversial
because it serves as the substantive gateway for the incorporation of norms
from other treaty sources with third-party states.236 These norms may not
necessarily be just substantive standards of investment protection, but also
procedural guarantees or benefits extended under the investor-state dispute
settlement mechanism in an investment treaty. In Emilio Agustin Maffezini v.
Kingdom of Spain, 237 the arbitral tribunal interpreted the MFN clause to
extend to substantive as well as procedural dispute settlement provisions of
233

RCEP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 27, at 18–20 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)
(drafting markups omitted).
234
CPTPP Draft Investment Chapter, supra note 28, art. 9.5, ¶¶ 1–3.
235
See ACIA, supra note 21, art. 6 n.4 (excluding application of the MFN clause to dispute settlement
procedures, but requiring that preferential treatment extended to any investors under existing or future
arrangements also be granted to parties to the ACIA); ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24,
art. 4, ¶ 3(a) (excluding MFN treatment to any preferential treatment already accorded in “existing bilateral,
regional and/or international agreements or any forms of economic or regional cooperation with any nonParty”); ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 5, ¶ 3(a) (same). The ASEAN-India
Investment Agreement, supra note 25; ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22; and the
ASEAN-Japan FTA, supra note 52, however, do not contain MFN clauses.
236
See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., MOST-FAVOURED-NATION TREATMENT: A SEQUEL, at xiv,
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2010/1, U.N. Sales No. 10.II.D.19 (2010), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/
diaeia20101_en.pdf. MFN clauses have also been argued to create a “multilateralizing” effect on investment
treaties. See Stephan W. Schill, Multilateralizing Investment Treaties Through Most-Favored-Nation
Clauses, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 496 (2009).
237
Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award, ¶ 21 (Nov. 13, 2000), 40 I.L.M
1148 (2001); see also Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Objections to Jurisdiction,
¶¶ 38–64 (Jan. 25, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 1129 (2001).

396

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 2

the applicable BIT. Given the variable formulations of MFN in the ASEAN
regional investment treaties, the respective BIT programs, and FTA
investment chapters of the individual ASEAN Member States, more time and
resources for comprehensive analysis and bilateral-regional research are
required to ascertain the precise scope of the MFN clauses simultaneously
applicable in the ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft
investment chapter, the CPTPP draft investment chapter, and the MFN clauses
still present in ASEAN Member States’ respective investment treaty
programs. The same issue has been noted by the European Parliament. They
recognized the serious legal uncertainty created by the overlap between future
investment policy directed at the regional level through the EU, and the
continuation of “intra-EU” BITs between EU Member States.238
The gravity of the MFN problem throughout Southeast Asia investment
treaties (bilateral, regional, or mega-regional, as in the case of RCEP and
CPTPP), can be illustrated by looking intra-ASEAN BITs that still exist
alongside the ACIA. Among its key objectives, the ACIA emphasizes the
“provision of enhanced protection to investors of all Member States and their
investments;” 239 the “improvement of transparency and predictability of
investment rules, regulations[,] and procedures conducive to increased
investment among Member States;”240 and the “joint promotion of the region
as an integrated investment area.” 241 To accomplish these objectives, the
ASEAN Member States are obligated to enhance ASEAN integration by
“harmonis[ing], where possible, investment policies and measures to achieve
industrial complementation.”242 The ACIA does not provide for any sunset
clauses or termination of pre-existing intra-ASEAN BITs, as the ACIA
expressly states that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall derogate from the
existing rights and obligations of a Member State under any other
international agreements to which it is a party.”243 In the case of an investorstate dispute under the ACIA, intra-ASEAN BITs could very well apply, since
the ACIA entitles the investor-state arbitral tribunal to “decide the issues in
238

See Stephen Woolcock, THE EU APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICY AFTER THE
LISBON TREATY, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES 58–59 ( 2010),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2010/433854/EXPO-INTA_ET(2010)433854_
EN.pdf.
239
ACIA, supra note 21, art. 1, ¶ 1(b).
240
Id. art. 1, ¶ 1(c).
241
Id. art. 1, ¶ 1(d).
242
Id. art. 26, ¶ 1(a).
243
Id. art. 44.
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dispute in accordance with [the ACIA], any other applicable agreements
between the Member States, and the applicable rules of international law.”244
With the simultaneous applicability of the ACIA and intra-ASEAN
BITs, several issues are likely to arise. First, given the differences in the
quality of investment protection afforded between the ACIA and the older
models of intra-ASEAN BITs, could ASEAN Member States be deemed to
have “complied” with the ACIA’s duties for all ASEAN Member States to
harmonize their investment policies to promote the region as an integrated
investment area? Continuing deviations from the qualitative standards and
obligations defined in the ACIA through the individual BITs between ASEAN
Member States could encourage the de facto inoperability of the ACIA’s
envisaged level, strategy, and quality of investment protection.
Second, the simultaneous applicability of the ACIA and the intraASEAN BITs muddles the governing law for investor-state disputes under the
ACIA. Where there are disparities between the quality of protection afforded
by an ASEAN Member State under its intra-ASEAN BIT and the quality of
investment protection that the same ASEAN Member State is obligated to
extend under the ACIA, it will likely be difficult for the ASEAN Member
State to muster ACIA-based defenses to investor claims when foreign
investors decide which investment treaty to invoke for purposes of initiating
suit. One can expect that foreign investors will still frame their cause of action
under the older intra-ASEAN BITs, which often do not contain any of the
public policy features discussed in Part III. ASEAN Member States may still
struggle to find plausible defenses or calibration mechanisms against investor
claims under the older generation of intra-ASEAN BITs.
Third and most importantly, the continued applicability of the intraASEAN BITs alongside the ACIA could very likely trigger questions of the
ASEAN Member States’ compliance with their fundamental ASEAN Charter
duties under Article 5(2) to “take all necessary measures, including the
enactment of appropriate domestic legislation, to . . . comply with all
obligations of membership.” 245 By continuing to pursue regulatory
governance bilaterally (within the framework and purposes of an intraASEAN BIT) despite the existence of the ACIA, it is doubtful an ASEAN
Member State could indeed be said to have taken “all necessary measures” to
implement its regional obligations, such as those that were specifically crafted
244
245

Id. art. 40, ¶ 1.
ASEAN Charter art. 5, ¶ 2.
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and designed in the ACIA based on the consensus of all ASEAN Member
States.
Such legal uncertainties likewise permeate other ASEAN regional
investment treaties. They also fail to harmonize and coordinate mechanisms
to govern ASEAN Member States’ duties under their individual BITs with the
ASEAN regional investment treaty partners without undermining regional
investment objectives and protections. For example, the ASEAN-India
Investment Agreement appears silent on the effects of this regional agreement
on India’s individual BITs with ASEAN Member States, 246 while the
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement explicitly recognizes the applicability
of other international agreements that entitle investments to treatment that
may be “more favorable” than provided for in the ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement.247 However, the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement does not
also apply its favorable public policy features or calibration mechanisms to
the investors’ entitlement to “more favorable treatment” in China’s older
individual BITs with the ASEAN Member States. The ASEAN-China
Investment Agreement does not contain any language purporting to supersede
or control the interpretation of investment treaty standards in China’s older
individual BITs with ASEAN Member States, or to make the same consistent
with the standards as formulated in the ASEAN-China Investment
Agreement. Neither does the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement contain
any provision creating a regional “sunset clause” for China’s BITs with
individual ASEAN Member States, thus perpetuating the same problems of
likely treaty-shopping for foreign investors interested in invoking the highest
degree of investment treaty protections with the least amount of available
defenses, mitigation mechanisms, or exculpatory exceptions for host-states.
The ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement contains a similar
recognition clause regarding other agreements entitling investors to more
favorable treatment, 248 sans the application of the host-state’s calibrating
mechanisms made available under the regional agreement. Just like the
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, the ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment
Chapter also explicitly permits “any other applicable agreements between the
parties”249 to apply as governing law to investor-state disputes, which could

246
247
248
249

See generally ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, supra note 25.
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement, supra note 23, art. 18, ¶ 1.
ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreement, supra note 24, art. 23, ¶ 1–2.
ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter, supra note 22, art. 27, ¶ 1.
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thus usher in Australia’s existing older individual BITs with the ASEAN
Member States. New Zealand does not have such BITs.
In sum, treaty standards under the intra-ASEAN BITs and the
individual BITs of ASEAN regional investment treaty external partners with
the ASEAN Member States could infuse the content and operation of the
ASEAN regional investment treaties in three ways. First, the MFN clauses in
these treaties open the door for foreign investors to import treatment and
protections beyond the four corners of the regional investment treaty. MFN
clauses in ASEAN Member States’ BITs, in turn, could also result in
importing standards of protection and treatment entitlements from BITs with
third states (i.e., states not parties to the ASEAN regional investment treaties),
which might not have been contemplated when standards of protection and
other treaty provisions were drafted in the ASEAN regional investment
treaties. The vast uncertainty created by MFN clauses as to the scope of
protection in the ASEAN regional investment treaties undermines the latter’s
usefulness for creating a predictable rules-based environment for regional
investment in Southeast Asia, especially under the aegis of the AEC and the
Charter-based ASEAN institutions.
Second, the ASEAN regional investment treaties’ definition of
investment “in accordance with laws, regulations, and policies” of ASEAN
Member States and/or their regional external partners (India, China, Korea,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) could create another opening for the
applicability of intra-ASEAN BITs and individual BITs with ASEAN
regional investment treaty external partners. If these intra-ASEAN BITs and
other individual BITs are deemed to be part of the “laws, regulations, and
policies” of the ASEAN Member States, investors under the ASEAN regional
investment treaties could be burdened with ensuring their investment
complies with such BITs at the time of admission and/or establishment of such
investment. The uncertain scope of “laws, regulations, and policies” tacked
on to the definition of investment in the ASEAN regional investment treaties
introduces another layer of uncertainty to how foreign investors are expected
to comply with the regulatory framework for the admission of their investment
and proper coverage under the ASEAN regional investment treaties. With no
centralized exchanges or information made available to date between the
ASEAN Member States in regard to their BITs, the foreign investor is left to
assume the risk that its investment may be deemed in the future to have failed
to comply with the “laws, regulations, and policies” of ASEAN Member
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States, including in the form of intra-ASEAN BITs and individual BITs with
ASEAN regional investment treaty partners.
Finally, intra-ASEAN BITs and other individual BITs with ASEAN
regional investment treaty external partners might also apply as part of the
governing law of investor-state disputes under the ASEAN regional
investment treaties, specifically for the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement
and the ASEAN-Aus-NZ FTA Investment Chapter. This expansion of the
applicable law could affect an arbitral tribunal’s future interpretation of
standards of investment protection, host-state defenses and exceptions, the
scope of covered investment, transparency requirements, and any other
obligations of host-states and home states of investment under the ASEAN
regional investment treaties.
C.

Applicability of Domestic Law to Investment Treaty Standards in
ASEAN Regional Investment Treaties

To reiterate, many provisions and substantive standards of the ASEAN
regional investment treaties routinely refer to the applicability of the ASEAN
Member States’ domestic laws and regulations. These “legality clauses”250
infuse meaning into the scope of covered investments under an investment
treaty (i.e., “investments made in accordance with investment law”), the
definition of nationality of investors, the legality of juridical persons, the
“public purpose” element in expropriation, general exceptions clauses,
transparency rules, and procedural rules, among others, as seen throughout the
ASEAN regional investment treaties. Precisely because references to “laws,”
“regulations,” and “policies” in the ASEAN regional investment treaties often
do not qualitatively delineate between different material sources of law, an
ASEAN Member State’s treaties and international agreements may also form
part of its legal system251 and be included among the “domestic law” infusing
substantive content into ASEAN regional investment treaty standards.
If Southeast Asian BITs could be transmitted as part of the applicable
domestic law for interpreting ASEAN regional investment treaties, there is a
real danger that stricter obligations for host-states towards investors under the
250
See generally Rahim Moloo & Alex Khachaturian, The Compliance with the Law Requirement in
International Investment Law, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1473 (2011).
251
The Philippines, for example, does not strictly require legislative enactment for treaties incorporated
into its legal system under the Incorporation Clause of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. CONST. (1987), art.
II, § 2 (Phil.); see also Diane A. Desierto, A Universalist History of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (II), 11
HISTORIA CONSTITUCIONAL 427, 475 (2010).
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Southeast Asian BITs could influence the interpretation of host-state
obligations under the ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft
investment chapter, and the CPTPP draft investment chapter. On the other
hand, the cross-fertilization of Southeast Asian BIT standards as part of the
“domestic law” of an ASEAN Member State applying to ASEAN regional
investment treaties could also introduce innovations in the latest generations
of Southeast Asian investment treaty commitments. 252 In any case, it is
crucial to examine how international law (specifically treaty law) is
incorporated into each of the ten ASEAN Member States’ respective legal
systems253 to ascertain the full extent to which international law could form
part of the corpus of “domestic law” applying to many critical ASEAN
regional investment treaty standards. The scope of such domestic law is vast,
given the diversity of legal systems among the ASEAN Member States, where
one finds “civil law systems, common law systems, a mixture of both systems,
and other legal traditions like Islamic law.”254
The domestic laws of the ASEAN Member States have a role as
governing law for investor-state disputes covered by the ICSID Convention.
Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention mandates the investor-state arbitral
tribunal “decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be
agreed upon by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute . . . and such
rules of international law as may be applicable.”255 Because of this provision,
both international and domestic law would apply in parallel sources of
governing law in the absence of any stipulation by the disputing parties.256
The explanation of the annulment committee in Wena Hotels v. Egypt
as to the role of the second sentence of Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention
is instructive. In that case, the Wena Hotels annulment committee
252

See, e.g., Draft EU-Singapore FTA, supra note 68, ch. 9.
Forthcoming country monographs in the ASEAN Integration Through Law series will discuss these
precise issues for each of the ten ASEAN Member States. For more information on this series, see Academic:
Integration Through Law, CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS, http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/
integration-through-law (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
254
MOHAMMAD F.A. NSOUR, RETHINKING THE WORLD TRADE ORDER: TOWARDS A BETTER LEGAL
UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF REGIONALISM IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADE REGIME 296 (2009).
255
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
art. 42, ¶ 1, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1966).
256
See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER ET AL., THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 618–21 (2d ed.
2009); Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of ‘and’ in Article 42(1), Second Sentence of the
Washington Convention: The Role of International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18 ICSID REV.
375 (2003).
253
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acknowledged that while there was scholarly and jurisprudential divergence
as to the actual scope of international law to be applied vis-à-vis the hoststate’s domestic law to investor-state disputes under the ICSID Convention,
in any event:
[W]hat is clear is that the sense and meaning of the negotiations
leading to the second sentence of Article 42(1) allowed for both
legal orders to have a role. The law of the host State can indeed
be applied in conjunction with international law if this is
justified. So too international law can be applied by itself if the
appropriate rule is found in this other ambit.257
Thus, where an ASEAN Member State can show that its other BITs
(particularly those that overlap with ASEAN regional investment treaty
partners) are monistically integrated into its domestic law—meaning that it
would automatically apply as domestic law without need of subsequent
legislative enactment or transformation of the treaty into statute—potential
disparities could also arise between the regional investment treaty standard
and the body of domestic law applied by the ASEAN Member State.
D.

Risk of Parallel Proceedings for Investor-State Claims Arising
from Breach of an ASEAN Regional Investment Treaty,
Individual Southeast Asian BIT, or FTA Investment Chapter

Given the linguistic variability between the ASEAN regional
investment treaties and the universe of over 600 Southeast Asian BITs and
FTA investment chapters, it is foreseeable that causes of action for separate
investor-state claims could be framed for breaches of standards in the ASEAN
regional investment treaties as well as Southeast Asian BITs, even if the
causes of action could fundamentally involve the same investment project.
Parallel multiple proceedings in investor-state treaty arbitration as a result of
the proliferation of investment treaties (regional and bilateral) cannot be
addressed without treaty coordination mechanisms in place to control for
preclusive effects, such as lis pendens, res judicata, forum non conveniens,
anti-suit injunctions, and consolidations, among others. 258 None of the

257

Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on the
Application for Annulment, ¶ 40 (Jan. 28, 2002), 41 ILM 933 (2002).
258
See, e.g., Katia Yannaca-Small, Parallel Proceedings, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 174, at 1008.
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ASEAN regional investment treaties provide for any stay of further
proceedings involving the same investment project or transaction.
Moreover, the ASEAN Member States should be aware that the
definition of “investment” in the ASEAN regional investment treaties
including shareholdings 259 might also include minority shareholders. In
Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, the arbitral
tribunal affirmed that insofar as foreign shareholders of local companies are
concerned, “[w]hatever the extent of [their] investment may have been, [they
were] entitled to invoke the BIT in respect of conduct alleged to constitute a
breach.”260 Likewise in Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic,261 the arbitral
tribunal found that where the investment treaty specifies shares as part of its
definition of investment and makes no distinction between majority and
minority shareholdings, such “[t]reaty language and intent is specific in
extending this protection to minority or indirect shareholders.” 262 The
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction in CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentina also affirmed that, where investment treaties do not distinguish
between majority and minority shareholders, the treaties do not deprive
minority shareholders of their rights as covered investors.263
Given the simultaneous applicability of an ASEAN regional investment
treaty and an individual BIT of an ASEAN Member State, there is a
substantial risk of parallel proceedings arising from different treaty-based
causes of action, as well as the possibility of claims lodged by minority
shareholders. ASEAN Member States should be concerned with this prospect
of multiplicity of investor-state disputes arising from essentially the same
investment project or investment transaction.
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Different Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in
ASEAN

There is no single global “fork in the road” clause that applies to all the
ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft investment chapter, the
CPTPP draft investment chapter, and ASEAN Member States’ pre-existing
and future individual BITs and FTA investment chapters that could bind an
investor claimant to an exclusive choice of remedy. Investors can choose a
combination of remedies from a full spectrum of court adjudication,
administrative tribunals, consultations, negotiations, conciliation procedures,
and investor-state arbitration. 264 Within this vast universe of forums, the
hierarchy, preference, and connection between these specialized treaty-based
dispute settlement mechanisms with existing dispute settlement mechanisms
under the ASEAN Charter-based system has not yet been studied. The 2004
ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism, for example,
states that its rules and procedures “shall apply to disputes brought pursuant
to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the Agreement as well
as the agreements listed in Appendix I and future ASEAN economic
agreements (the ‘covered agreements’).”265 This provision could be a basis
to invoke the dispute settlement system in the ASEAN Protocol, which
appears more structurally analogous to the WTO’s dispute settlement
processes through assembled Panels with appeals brought to a standing
Appellate Body.266 It should be stressed here that Article 24 of the ASEAN
Charter states that “[w]here not otherwise specifically provided, disputes
which concern the interpretation or application of ASEAN economic
agreements shall be settled in accordance with the ASEAN Protocol on
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism.”267 Further analysis, not just of
treaty texts but also of the corresponding travaux preparatoires, is necessary
to examine the dispute settlement and procedural implications from all of the
language of the ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft
investment chapter, the CPTPP draft investment chapter, the over 600
ASEAN Member States’ respective individual BITs and FTA investment
chapters, the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism,
and the ASEAN Charter.
264
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CONCLUSION

The ASEAN regional investment treaties, the RCEP draft investment
chapter, and the CPTPP draft investment chapter contain various mechanisms
for host-states to retain regulatory discretion, policy space, and to narrow the
scope of possible disputes with investors. On the one hand, the more
concerted drafting efforts demonstrate the region’s preference to “rebalance”
commitments to investors with states’ individual and regional interests. On
the other hand, however, because ASEAN Member States have not given any
formal precedence to these treaties, they continue to exist amid much older
preexisting generations of BITs for each ASEAN Member State. These BITs
do not contain as many public policy innovations as the ASEAN regional
investment treaties (and the RCEP draft) attempt. Consequently, investors
have not brought claims under these treaties, and instead pursue recourse
under the more liberal provisions of the older BIT regimes that emphasize
investment protection and reserve little prerogatives for host-states to defend
their regulatory measures. Unless ASEAN (and parties to RCEP) purposely
create mechanisms to govern the interaction of preexisting BITs with the
stricter standards in the regional investment treaties, it will likely be a long
time before these treaties are invoked in investor-state disputes.
The AEC Blueprint 2025 set out the vision to “[c]reate a deeply
integrated and highly cohesive ASEAN economy” by “[p]romot[ing] the
principles of good governance, transparency, and responsive regulatory
regimes” through various stakeholders, and “[w]ork[ing] towards a common
position . . . in global economic fora.”268 ASEAN Member States already
recognize the need for “effective, efficient, coherent, and responsive
regulations, and good regulatory practices.”269
Regional economic integration necessitates policy and
regulatory changes and refinements in most, if not all, ASEAN
Member States, taking into consideration their different levels of
development . . . . ASEAN Member States need to ensure that
the regulatory regime is relevant, robust, effective, coherent,
transparent, accountable, and forward looking in terms of
regulatory structures and design, as well as implementation
processes. 270
268
269
270
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Strategic measures identified in the AEC Blueprint 2025 to achieve these
goals include enacting regulations that are “pro-competitive, commensurate
with objectives, and non-discriminatory,” while undertaking regular “review
of existing regulatory implementation processes and procedures for further
streamlining.”271
This regional concern for regulatory quality, predictability, coherence,
and transparency should also extend now to ASEAN’s investment treaty
commitments. With the continued robust growth of foreign investment in
Southeast Asia under ASEAN economic integration, measures for legal
harmonization and regional institutional coordination are increasingly
necessary. The ASEAN Investment Area Coordinating Council, the ASEAN
CCI, and all the ad hoc ASEAN bodies created under the ASEAN regional
investment treaties must ensure regularly coordinated exchanges of
information within a more formalized framework under the umbrella of the
AEC. These information exchanges should centralize the pre-existing and
future investment treaty commitments of each ASEAN Member State with
those assumed by ASEAN at the regional level through the ASEAN regional
investment treaties, as well as with those to be anticipated from mega-regional
investment treaties such as the RCEP draft investment chapter and the CPTPP
draft investment chapter. Ongoing monitoring of the formulation of standards
on the coverage of these treaties (including areas for entry of other investment
treaty norms) should be transparently reported to the ASEAN Member States
before they sign any future ASEAN regional investment agreements. The
impacts of diversified investment treaty protection standards, host-state
defenses of their regulatory and public policy spaces, and avenues for
participation of the widest possible stakeholders in foreign investment
(especially including local communities directly affected by the operations of
foreign investment) must be routinely examined, assessed, and reported by the
AEC to the ASEAN Summit. It is only by properly implementing the
objectives of legal harmonization and coordination in the realm of ASEAN
(and ASEAN Member States’) investment treaty commitments that ASEAN
will realize its vision of a cohesive, consistent, and predictable Southeast Asia
investment policy driving the growth of balanced and sustainable Southeast
Asia investment.
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